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Abstract
We first argue that the improved performance of modern theorem
provers is due basically to the use of domain dependent deductive
knowledge possessing certain simple properties. We exemplify this
thesis by discussing various theorem provers for propositional logic
and then for elementary arithmetic. In particular we describe a
domain dependent theorem prover for elementary arithmetic which we
have implemented.
Secondly, we then argue that theorem provers based on domain
dependent knowledge, such as our arithmetic theorem prover, are not
the kinds of deductive systems that are needed as a component of a
mathematical reasoning system. The reason for this being that such
systems are not extensible in that they cannot assimilate and use new
deductive knowledge produced by a mathematical reasoning system.
Finally, we describe a prototype deductive system, for the domain of
elementary set theory, which is extensibe in this sense.
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This report is concerned with the kinds of deductive systems
that are needed as a component of an automated mathematical reason¬
ing system. It is not particularly concerned with the development
of deductive mechanisms as a goal in itself, and in this distinction
lies our thesis.
We begin in Chapter II by describing and comparing two automatic
theorem provers for propositional logic. We will find that one of
these theorem provers, namely the one called Wang's Algorithm is a
far better proof procedure than is the other one. The reason for
this being,that Wang1s Algorithm does not prove theorems by using the
given axioms and inference rules of propositional logic as does the
other theorem prover, but instead proves theorems by using a special
set of rules which,when applied, tend in an intuitive sense to result
in simpler and simpler subgoals to prove. In other words, the
superiority of Wang's Algorithm lies in its use of special domain
dependent knowledge; that is in its use of specific rules with
certain properties, applied to a specific mathematical
domain which is in this case the propositional logic.
Next, we suggest that this is a very general phenomena, and
that for just about any mathematical domain, one can in practice find
a special set of rules of such a nature as to result in domain de¬
pendent theorem prover which would be a far.better theorem prover
than one based on using only the original and generally accepted
axioms and inference rules of that domain. In Chapter III we will
exemplify the truth of this last remark by describing a domain de-
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pendent theorem prover for the domain of elementary arithmetic which
we have implemented. This theorem prover which uses about SO special
arithmetic rules rather than just the Peano axioms can easily be seen
to be quite efficient. As a side issue we will also compare this
theorem prover to another domain dependent theorem prover for arith¬
metic, which, however, is based on the use of special rules which are
not quite as well chosen as are the rules of our system. This will
provide some evidence for our assertion in Chapter II, that the
special rules of an efficient domain dependent theorem prover, should
possess certain specific properties.
Then in Chapter IV we present our major thesis: that domain
dependent deductive knowledge systems such as the one described in
Chapter III are not the kind of deductive system that is needed in
order to automate mathematical reasoning. Essentially we argue
that deductive knowledge systems for mathematical ireasoning must, in
a realistic way, be capable of being extended by the acquisition of
new deductive knowledge such as new rules, or new strategies for using
rules.
We call a deductive system with this capability an extensible
deductive knowledge system and in Chapter V we describe a prototype
extensible deductive knowledge system for the domain of elementary set
theory which we have implemented. Specifically this system proves
theorems in the set theory described in W.V.O.Quine's book Set Theory
and its Logic [1].
Note, however, that an extensible deductive system does not in
itself include the acquisition procedures which create the new de-
ductive knowledge, for these acquisition procedures fall in the area
of inductive reasoning. We will, however, call any system which
includes both an extensible deductive system and an inductive reason¬
ing system, a mathematical reasoning system.
Finally, in Chapter VI we draw a few conclusions.
The reader should note that this is a very modular thesis in that
each chapter may be read independently of any other chapter. Thus,
for example, if the busy reader only wishes to know why extensible
deductive knowledge systems are needed for mathematical reasoning, he
need only read Chapter IV. Or, for example, if he is only interested
in how one might automate deductive reasoning in elementary set theory,
he need only read Chapter V.
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II The Rise of Deductive Knowledge Systems
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the kinds of auto¬
matic theorem provers for mathematics*, that were prevalent in 1974,
and indeed prevalent even now, came to have been produced. In
opposition to such an explanation, if one were to make only a super¬
ficial historical survey of the research in this field one would
probably obtain the impression that this field consists of many
fundamentally different approaches and techniques. In particular,
one would find a bewildering variety of approaches to proving theorems,
and an even more bewildering variety of propaganda supporting those
various approaches.
However, since an examination of the actual results that have-
been obtained will certainly convince one that a great deal of pro¬
gress in this field has,in fact, been made, though not necessarily
for the reasons that have been given, the question remains as to the
reasons for this progress.
Ignoring relatively minor considerations such as the improvement
in computer hardware, our view is that the improved performance of
automatic theorem provers during the last twenty years is directly
attributable to the application of a single basic idea to larger and
larger areas of mathematics. This basic idea is simply that one
should build into the automatic theorem prover as much deductive
knowledge, in terms of rules and how to use them, as is possible
* This thesis is not concerned with, the use of automatic theorem
provers as interpreters of logical programming languages.
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about the mathematical domain under consideration. To emphasize
the importance of this idea we will call such theorem provers:
domain dependent deductive knowledge systems. Domain dependent
deductive systems are, of course, no longer general purpose theorem
provers which can accept axioms from any domain, for their power
depends crucially on the embedding of special rules .of that partic¬
ular mathematical domain.
In fhe remainder of this chapter we will exemplify this basic
idea by describing and comparing a domain dependent deductive system
for the propositional logic, called Wang's Algorithm [10] with a
general purpose theorem proving method which simply applies the in¬
ference rules of that domain in reverse to the theorem one is trying
to prove, producing new subgoals to prove,' and continuing in this
fashion until all the subgoals are themselves axioms of that domain.
A particular theorem prover for the propositional logic which is
based on this general purpose theorem proving method is the Logic
Theorist [25]. Before describing these two theorem provers, we
first, however, describe the propositional logic itself.
2. Propositional Logic
Propositional logic is a systemitized version of a very small
part of the language we speak. Its subject matter is the formation
of complex sentences from elementary sentences and the methods of de¬
termining the logical truth or non truth of such sentences.
The syntax of Propositional Logic consists of the following
elements:
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(1) Elementary sentences which express propositions such as:
(2 plus 2 equals 4), (blockl is on the table)
(2) Propositional variables such as:
P, Q, R
and (3) the logical connectives which are written below followed








Using these elementary sentences, propositional variables, and
logical connectives we may form complex sentences such as:
(2 plus 2 equals 4) A (blockl is on the table)
P P
P V ((blockl is on the table)A Q)
Having now exemplified what are the sentences of this language,
we can now give a criteria for determining which sentences are logically
true, and which are not. First we note that some sentences such as:
N , P D P
are logically true, that some sentences such as:
n
, P A (v P)
are logically false, and that some sentences sxich as:
(blockl is on the table)
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are neither logically true nor logically false.
In order to define which sentences are logically true we will
first simplify the problem by showing that if we can define logical
truths for those sentences containing no logical connectives other
than and then we can define logical truth for all sentences.
We do this by simply defining all the other logical connectives in
terms of 3 and ^ as follows*:
P V Q =df Cvp) O o
P A Q =df vq)
P Q =df (P.")Q) A (Q3P)
U =df py^p
« =df ^
Given this simplification, we can then give a criteria to de¬
termine which sentences are logically true, and which are not,
namely**: the sentences which are logically true are precisely
those which may be deduced from the axioms and inference rules of
propositional logic. The three axioms of propositional logic are:
Al: P 3 (Q P)
A2: (P 3 (Q 3 R)) 3 ((P 3 Q) 3 (P R) )
A3: P) ) 3 P
The two inference rules of propositional logic are:
* =df is an informal symbol such that for all expressions a and for
all expressions 3, a =df 3 means that a is defined to be 3-
** In view of the completeness theorem for propositional logic we
know that logical truth and theoremhood are equivalent concepts.
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R1: from a sentence a and a sentence of the form (a 3 g)
deduce g.
R2: from a sentence a deduce the sentence obtained from a
by substituting any sentence g for all occurrences in a
of any particular propositional variable.
For example, using these axioms and inference rules we could
determine that P ^3 P is logically true by the following deduction
A2 ->■ (P p (Q 3 R)) 3 ((P P Q) .3 (p .p r)) ;A2
A2 -> (p P (Q p)) 3 (p 3 Q) (p 3> p)) ;by R2 with R:=P
•I'
A2 -> (P 3 ((q P p) ;p P)) 3 ((P 3 (Q 3 p)) ZD (P P P) ) :by
6 R2 with Q:=(QP
A1 -> P 3 (Q 3 P) :by Al.
4-
A1 -> p 3 ((q p p) P p) :by R2 with
a Q:~Q =5 P
A1,A2 (p .3 (Q 3 p) ) .3 (p 3 p)
a
:by R1
Al -* P D (Q 3 P) :by Al
— ■' a
A1,A2 -> P 3 P :by R1
In this proof the -> sign in 0^. . . 0n -*■ a is just an informal symbol
which we use to indicate that the sentence a is deducible from the
axioms g ...g . Note that the sentences a at the tip of this tree
1 n
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are all axioms and that the sentence at the root of the tree is the
theorem we are trying to prove. Note also, that the sentence at
the root of any subtree is obtained from the sentences at the nodes
just above that root node.
3. The Logic Theorist
Having now defined what sentences are logically true we are left
with the problem of developing a feasible method of determining whether
any given sentence is logically true. One method of determining this
would be to apply the inference rules in all possible ways to the
axioms and to the resulting sentences obtained by applying those rules,
and periodically checking to see if the theorem is one; of those results.
However, this method would appear to be rather infeasible as it makes
no real use* of the structure of the sentence to be proven in directing
the search for its proof. Probably for this reason the first auto¬
matic theorem prover for the prepositional logic, the Logic Theorist
[25] was designed so as to search for a proof by starting from the
theorem to be proven and applying the inference rules Rl, R2 backwards,
producing new subgoals as theorems to be proven until the only remain¬
ing subgoals were themselves axioms.
Thus, for example, in order to prove POP the Logic Theorist
* Of course one could make use of the structure of the theorem in a
weak heuristic sense by choosing to first apply inference rules to
those axioms and results which are the most syntactically similar
to the theorem being proven.
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would produce a trace s imilar to the following one:
Al, A2 ®
Al, p . (q ;d r> 3 ((P ^ 2) ' <p ^ ■ > <?>
Al, (P 1L> Q) ;:> (P —2 R) (D (D
-k
Al -> P "o(Q :o R)
p?(Q 3 P) -* p(Q ^ R)
true if R=P
P R (pi ;'3 <^p) Al P Z> Q
p ~0(q' ^ p) p 2
true ifCp = (p) by R2 true if Q = (q' Z> P) by R2
[r = (p) by R2
Note that since we are trying to prove P .U P for all P, the
variable P must not itself be instantiated by R2. For this reason
we have circled this P as (?) , so as to indicate that it must be
treated as being a constant. Note also, that one occurrence of Q
is indicated as Q*. This is due to the fact that the variables
of distinct axioms are conceptually distinct.
Note also that we have only given that part of the trace of the
search for this proof of P O P, that was actually relevant to it.
For example, some of the other possible branches of the trace are
where R1 is first applied not to the main implication sign in A2
but to the main implication sign in Al or A3.
The basic problem of searching for a proof in this manner is that
although the Logic Theorist uses the structure of the theorems in
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searching for their proof, it does not really use the structure of
the axioms themselves except in the weak sense of choosing to apply
inference rules backwards first to those goals which are most
syntactically similar to Some axiom.*
4. Wang's Algorithm
The first automatic theorem prover to essentially make use of
the structure of both the axioms and the theorem was one implemented
by Wang in about 1960 [10]. This system which is based on applying
the rules of Gentzen's [27] LK sequent calculus backwards, involves
letting -* which had been an informal symbol now be a formal symbol of
the calculus such that:
A . .. <j> -> ' \p1 n 1 m
is interpreted to mean
(f>, A - - - /\cj> 3 \/ . . .\/1 n 1 m
Thus -> is sort of an n+m ary implication symbol.
The axioms and rules of this system are not those previously
given, but instead, those axioms and inference rules are deleted, and
* Since there are several axioms and only one theorem to be proven it
is easy to see that more sentences will be syntactically similar to
at least one axiom, than to that theorem. For this reason the search
space obtained when searching forwards from the axioms will probably
be smaller than the search space obtained when searching backwards.
Thus it is probably better to search forwards as did Siklossy and
Rich [26]. Note, however, that the structure of the theorem is not
really used, and hence this system, also suffers the same basic defect
as the Logic Theorist.
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the following five new inference rules are added:
3"*: (..P -2 Q. iff (..Q. and (.. .. -y P ..)
-»0: (..->-..P r> Q..) iff (..P ->(Q ..)
'v (. .'v P iff (.. .. ->P ..)
-y 'VP ..) iff (.. P-*.. ..)
Atom: (..P.. -y. .P . .) iff true
These five rules are applied by replacing expressions which match
the left hand side of these rules by the expression obtained from
the right hand side expression. Note that the 1> -* rule is similar to
but not the same as applying R1 backwards. We see that this system
trivially makes essential use of its axioms by the mere fact that
there is only one axiom, namely "true". Of course, this fact alone
is not a sufficient condition for a theorem prover to be very
efficient, as the efficiency also depends on the precise nature of
the inference rules of the system, but it is a necessary condition.
Later in section 5 we will characterize the nature of these rules
which cause this system to be so efficient at proving theorems. We
now give a few examples of proofs obtained by using this system:
The first example is to prove that P implies P:
-> P 3 P :-»0
P -y P :Atom
true








R, Q, P -> R :Atom Q, P -»- R, Q :Atom
true true
Just a few examples should convince anyone as to the superiority
of this theorem prover in comparison to the Logic Theorist.
5. Comparison
Having now described the propositional calculus and two de¬
ductive knowledge systems for it, we will now draw a few conclusions.
First, we see that Wang's Algorithm is a far better method of proving
theorems than is the Logic Theorist, for whereas Wang's Algorithm
involves no searching and the Logic Theorist does involve searching.
Essentially we see that there are three underlying technical
reasons for the superiority of Wang's systems:
(1) First it is sema'ntically complete. That is, the conjunction of
sequents resulting from the application of a rule to a sequent
is logically equivalent to it.
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-* (P 3 (Q 3 R) ) 3 ( (P 3 Q) 3 (P => R) )
P'J (Q 3 R) ->■ (P 3 Q) .3 (P 3 R)
PI) (Q 3 R) , P 3 Q -> P 3 R
P3 (Q 3 R) , P 3 Q, P -> R
* A
P 3(Q 3 R) , Q, P -> R :3 P3(Q 3 R) ,P -> R,P
Q 3 R, Q, P -* R : 3 ->• Q, P -> R, P :Atom
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(2) Second, it is terminal. That is the result of applying a rule
decreases in an obvious way the complexity of the sequent.
(3) Third, it is deterministic, in that essentially only one rule
is applicable to any formula in a sequent.
In summary then, we can say that the superiority of Wang's
Algorithm is due precisely to its use of special rules for the
domain of propositional logic which possess these three properties.
On the other hand note that the Logic Theorist does not possess
deductive knowledge with these properties but instead uses only the
axiom and inference rules of propositional logic. So, in fact, we
can say that the superiority of Wang's Algorithm is due to its
possession of relatively sophisticated domain dependent deductive
knowledge possessing the above charactex-istics.
6. Conclusion
We have seen that the superiox-ity of Wang's Algorithm lies in
its use of special domain dependent knowledge. We suggest that this
is a very general phenomena and that given just about any mathematical
domain, one can in practice find a special set of rules of such a
nature as to result in a domain dependent theorem prover which would
be superior to a theorem prover based on using only the axioms and
inference rules of the given domain. In the next chapter we will
investigate this last assertion as applied to the domain of elementary
arithmetic.
In reading the next chapter, it should be borhg in mind that it is
not the fact that a domain dependent theorem prover is more efficient
than a general purpose one based in this case on the Peano axioms of
15
arithmetic, that is being defended for who would seriously question
this assertion? Rather it is the specific nature of the special
rules (as stated in section 5) which should be used by such a domain
dependent theorem prover, that is being defended.
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III Doing Arithmetic without Diagrams
1. Introduction
This is a report of work completed in seventeen days during the
fall of 1974. It describes an automatic theorem prover for the
elementary theory of natural numbers, which represents theorems as
lists and proves them by applying truth-value preserving transforma¬
tions.
The motivation for this research derives from some suggestions
made in 1973 as to how "Knowledgeable" theorem provers might be con¬
structed. It will be recalled that at that time a number of re¬
searchers, Bundy [20,21] for the domain of elementary number theory
and Ballantyne and Bennett [22] for the domain of topology, had
advocated the construction of theorem provers along the following
lines: That the hypotheses of theorems should be represented as
diagrams, or rather semantic nets whose nodes are objects such as
1, 2, 0, and whose arcs are properties such as =, <£ , e; and
that theorems should be proven by a process of forward chaining
from the hypotheses in the diagram. The objective of this re¬
search was to determine whether it was better to base a theorem prover
for elementary number theory on the traditional list notation and
truth-value preserving transformations, or on diagrams and forward
chaining.
2. Description of the Theorem Prover
Our theorem prover consists of an interpreter for mathematical
expressions and many items of mathematical knowledge. This interp¬
reter is a fairly complex mechanism, but it may be viewed as applying
items of mathematical knowledge of the form: <j> •*->- \l> or <j> = to the
17
theorem being proven, in the following manner: The interpreter
evaluates the theorem recursively in a call-by-need manner. That
is, if (fa^.-.a^) is a sub-expression being evaluated, then the
interpreter tries to apply its items of knowledge to that sub¬
expression before evaluating the arguments a^...a^. For each sub¬
expression that the interpreter evaluates, in turn it tries to match
the <J> expression of each item to that sub-expression. If, however,
during the application process an argument a^ does not match the
corresponding argument of the <{> expression, then is evaluated, and
the system then tries to match the result of that evaluation. If
ever the interpreter finds a sub-expression cj>0 which is an instance
of <|> of some item, then it replaces that expression by the corres¬
ponding instance 4>0 of \p. At this point all memory of the sub¬
expression <pd is immediately lost and the interpreter now evaluates
\pd. If no items can be applied to a sub-expression then the sub¬
expression is not evaluated again but is simply returned.
For example if x+o=x and x+o=o+x are the only items and if
they are listed to be used in that order then evaluating the theorem
A+(B+o)^A will cause the sub-expression B+o to be replaced by B re¬
sulting in A+B^A. All memory of the sub-expression B+o is immediately
lost upon its replacement by B and thus the interpreter does not
attempt to apply the second item to B+o.
This theorem prover has a great deal of logical and arithmetic
knowledge. We first describe the items of logical knowledge, and
then the items of arithmetic knowledge.
2.1 logical Knowledge
Out theorem prover has knowledge about twelve logical symbols
18












implies (This symbol is called a sequent arrow)
and and (This symbol is used to form an implicit conjunction
of sequents)
The sequent arrow may be defined as follows:
(f>l,. . . ,<j>n if>1, . . . ,(Jm = (1A . . . A (fin) ro (ifily . . .V ifm)
where <fii and ifij are sentences. Thus a sequent may be thought of as
being a database of statements <j>l, ... (fin called assertions which
occur before the sequent arrow, and statements ifil, ... $n called goals
which occur after the sequent arrow. The implicit conjunction of
different sequents may be thought of as being a group of different
databases.
The items of logical knowledge, which are all schemata because











.. B ..a..) *a (.. ..a-..)
. . n . .a-. . ) aa Q
. .^x ..a-..) aa (.. ..ax ..)
. .x Ay. .) aa (.
. .x vy. .) aa (.
. .x Dy. .a-. .) aa (.
. . xaay. .a. . ) aa (.
. . Vxijix. .a-. . ) aa (.
x,y . .a. .)
x..a..) and (..y..a..)
..ax..) and (,.y..a..)
x,y ..a..) and (.. ..a x,y ..) .
Vx<j>x,<j>* . .a. .)
where * is a new unification variable.
3 a; (. . 3xd)x. .a. .) aa (.,<]>(£*...*In
where f is a new skolem function and * ...* are all the
1 n
; unification variables which occur in <jix.
= a: (Ila. .•1^1*"" n^ **"!•• raa<j)a . .ijja) aa (Jit. . . . Tt a (ft .
I t = (/* ..* ))
1 n
where a is (/*,...* )In
and f is a skolera function not occurring in t.
This is our version of the Law of Leibnitz, for example:
(A=B+C a OSA) aa (a C^B+C)
Goal schemata:
. Tpt)
~y E : (. .a. . m .. aa ia
n : (..a.. H .. aa • • • . ..)
~y~ 'Ki : (..a.^x .. aa . . xa. • ..)
A : (. .a. .x Ay. . aa . .a . .x..) and (..a..y..)
V'' : (. .a. .x V y. . aa . .a . •x,y..)
*->- D : (. .a. .xts y. . aa . . xa. • y. •)
—y aa; (. .a. . xaay. . aa ' . .xa.
~y V : (. .a. . Vx<j>x. . aa . .a .
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where / is a new skolern function and are all the
1 n
unification variables which occur in <J>x.
->■ 3: 3xtj>x..) -*->• cj>*, 3x<j>x..)
where * is a new unification variable.
Other logical schemata:
Atom: (. .x. .x. .) <-*■ £1
And : (. . and Eg and. .) <-*■ (. . and. .)
Unify: (...x, .y, ..) and..and (..x .y ..)11 n n
[(.. x .y...) and..and (..x . ,->..y ..)]0
11 n n
where 0 is any one of the substitutions which, makes tautologous
the greatest number of sequents starting with the first sequent
and progressing towards the nth sequent. For example, an
instance of this schema is:
[ (P* -> Pa, Pb) and (Q* -* Qb) and (R* -> Ra) 3 ■<->■ [Rb ■> Ra]
Note that the unification variable was instantiated to b,
not to a, because the substitution [* =b3 unifies the first
two sequents, whereas [* =a3 unifies only the first sequent.
Finally, we note that if all sequents can be made
tautologous by some substitution then (B is returned.
A substitution 0 is applied to a sequent as follows: Success¬
ively, for each substitution [* =(t *_...* )] every occurrence of *1' n
which occurs inside a skolem function is replaced by the segment
*
... * , and every other occurrence of * is replaced by the term
(t *,...* ). Thus for example if the sequent is
In
■+ * = (/*)+*
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where f is a skolem function, then applying the substitution
[* ~ *2^ Pr°duces the new sequent:
-> * L * — (X-k k \ + ( * ~ \
1 2 v 1 2; ■ 1 2
If the substitution is (*:= A) then the new sequent would be:
-> A = f + A
where f becomes a skolem constant.
The schemata V -> and -> 3 and applied only as last resorts.
Furthermore, all other schemata are applied before the unify schema.
More precisely, the logical schemata are used as follows: Initially
the interpreter evaluates each sequent first trying to apply any
assertion schema other than V ■*, then trying to apply any goal schema
other than 3, and then trying to apply the atom schema. When no
more of these schemata can be applied and if the result is not
then the interpreter picks a sequent from the implicit conjunction
of sequents and applies the ->■ '3 and V schemata once to each formula
in that sequent which begins with '3 or V respectively. The resulting
sequent is then evaluated as before using all the schemata except for
-> 3 , V -»■ , and Unify. After evaluation the Unify schema is applied to
the resulting sequents. Any sequents returned after applying the
Unify schema, are added to the implicit conjunction of sequents and
the process of picking a new sequent to work on repeats itself until
is derived.
It will turn out, however, that the theorem prover will prove
all the arithmetic theorems given in this paper without needing to
use the -> 3 , V or Unify schemata. This is not the case for other
mathematical domains such as set theory.
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The fact that, only assertion equations are ever eliminated by
= schema implies a preference, for sequents containing only
equations, not to have more than one goal equation. The reason for
this preference is that there is no logical item which, allows two
goal equations to interact to produce B8. Thus one of the goals
would probably be irrelevant.
The application of every assertion or goal procedure to a data¬
base involves a particular logical symbol other than 'and' or .
For this reason we may view such procedures as being instructions of
a language which manipulates databases. For example, the execution
of the goal instruction -*■ A on A A B creates two new databases
(worlds, contexts) as follows:
(1) First A A B is erased from the current database.
(2) A copy of the database is then created. (Actually
in our system all this structure is shared.)
(3) B is added as a new goal to the copy.
(4) A is added as a new goal to the current database.
A summary of the effect of goal and assertion instructions is given
in Figure 1. Note that the interpreter has complete freedom of
choice both as to what database to work on first, and as to what in¬
struction to execute first.
An informed reader will recall that these propositional rules
are used in Wang's algorithm in the LISP 1.5 manual [9], and that
Wang tlO] used the other rules restricted to the decidable case of
where only skolem constants, but not skolem functions, were necessary.
The general idea of unification is due to Prawitz [11] who used rules
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Table 1: Summary of Logical Instructions
Instructions* effect as an assertion effect as a goal
no-op**** succeed
H succeed*** no-op
'VA add A as a goal assert A
A A B assert A and B split |'add A as a goal
^add B as a goal
A y B split** ^assert A
(assert B
add A and B as goals
A O B split /'add A as a goal
J
assert A, add B as a
1
<yassert B goal
A •*-> B split ('add A and b as goals split
i
[assert A and B Assert A, cina add goal B
>
\
assert B, and add goal A
Vxij)x assert cf>* where * is a new add goal <j> (f* ... * )In
unification variable. where f is a new
skolem function.
3x<j>x assert <{>(/* ...*n) where add goal <}>* where * is
f is a new skolem function a new unification
(f* ...* ) = t
( 1 n )
t = (/•* ...* )
1 n
replace all occurrences of
(/* ... * ) by t.In
variable.
* With the exception of the V assertion instruction and the 3
goal instruction, and executed instruction is always erased.
** Split means that a new data base is created.
*** Succeed means that the data base itself is erased.
**** a null-operation.
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similar to all the rules given here exoept for = ■* and unify. His
unification rule leads to a complete logic, ours does not.
2.2 Arithmetic Knowledge
Our theorem prover has knowledge about ten arithmetic symbols




P funny predecessor (P0=0)
+ plus
- funny minus (0-X=X)
times
< less than
^ less than or equal to
| divides
The items of arithmetic knowledge, some of which, are lemmas because
they do not involve ellipses, and some of which are schemata are
listed below. It should be noted that certain items, as indicated,
are applied only to goals, or only to assertions. Such items have
been carefully chosen with these restrictions in mind, so as to
minimize the introduction of unification variables.
Definitions:
A1: S x = 1 + x
A2: P x = x - 1
A3: x<y ^3u y+u = x if the sub-expression being evaluated occurs in
in a goal,
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A4: x<y +-*■ x+(u+l) = y if the sub-expression being evaluated
occurs in an assertion.
A5: x<y +-+ ^3u y+(u+l) = x if the sub-expression being evaluated
occurs in a goal.
A6: x^y +-»- 3u x+u = y if the sub-expression being evaluated
occurs in an assertion.
A7: 2 = SI
A8: 3 = S2
etc.
Items for equality:
A9: x+y = o ■*-+ x = 0 A y = o
A10: o = x+y +-+ x = o A y = o
All: x*y = o +-+'x = o V y = o
A12: o = x*y -<-> x = o V y = o
A13: x+y = l-<-+(x = oAy=l)V (x = l A y = o)
A14: 1 = x+y -^(x=oAy=l)V (x = 1 A y = o)
A15: x*y = 1 -++• x = 1 A y=l
A16: 1 = x*y +-+ x=l A y=l
A17: o = 1 -<-+ «
A18: 1 = o +-+ «
A19: o = o +-> U
A20: 1 = 1 +-+ B
A21: .. + x+ .. = .. + x+ .. .. + .. = .. + ..
This last item is the cancellation schema of addition, which can
be stated as follows: "The sentence containing two occurrences of the
same term each connected via any number of plus signs to opposite
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sides of an outermost equality sign is equivalent to the sentence
obtained by cancelling those two occurrences of that term". For
example:
A + (B + C) = D + (E + B) A + C = D + E
Items for divides:
A22: x 1 -e* x = 1 if the sub-expression being evaluated occurs in a
goal.
A23: o X <->■ X = o if the sub-expression being evaluated occurs in a
goal.
A24: 1 X ■<—>■ IS if the sub-expression being evaluated occurs in a
goal.
A25: X o E if the sub-expression being evaluated occurs in a
goal.
A26: X (. . • x* . .) {T} x* ..) if the sub-expression
being evaluated occurs in an assertion.
A more explicit statement of A26 is:
x | <J>x -<—> H
where <j>x is a term formed from any number of + and - signs and any
number of products a,..a such that each a. is of the form:In 1
V--'3i1 n
and for all i there exists a j such that 3. is X.
j
For example:
A| (A»C) + ((B«A)-A) -*-»• $




A28 : x+o = x
A29: o+x = x
A30: (x+y)+z = x+(y+z)
A31: (x+y)+z = z+(x+y) if z is not a term beginning with a plus si
Lemmas for times:
A32: x*o = o
A3 3: o*x = o
A34: X'l = x
A35: l*x = x
A36: x* (y+z) = (x»y)+(x*z)
A37: (x+y)*z = (x*z)+(y*z)
A38: (x»y)*z = x* (y«z)
A39: (x*y)*z = z* (x*y) if z is not a term beginning with a times
sign.
Items for minus:
A40: o-x = o
A41: X-O = X
A42: (x-y)-z = x-(y+z)
A43: (..+ x+..) _ (..+ x+..) =
for example: A+B-C+A = B- C
Lemmas for case analysis:
A44: <f>[x - y] (Vz.x = z+y <j>z) A ("3u x+u = y. ^ . <J>o) if the
sub-expression being evaluated occurs in a goal.
A45: cfc[x - y] +-»• (]z x = z+y A <j>z) V (-]u x+u = y A (^o) if the





J ( . . *X* . . ) = ( . . *X« . . ) | + | (. . *x* . . )
•
. .) V X = 0
This last item is simply the operation of factoring out x. An
example is:
These lemmas are used only when all else fails.
Proof by contradiction:
A47: x = y ^3u x+l+u = y A ^3w y+l+w = x
if the sub-expression being evaluated occurs in a goal and
all else fails.
The proof by contradiction heuristic is essentially a method of
allowing interaction between two goal equations. It does this by
transforming one of the equations into assertion equations,.thus
allowing the extensionality schema = -> to'be used.
Magnitude heuristic:
A48: x+y = utv (3z x+z - u A v+z = y) V (3w u+w = x /\ y+w = v)
if the sub-expression being evaluated occurs in an assertion
and all else fails.
The justification that this last lemma is indeed a theorem can be
seen by observing:
A* B + OA = D* A - A ■*-*- B+C = D-l V A = 0
x y X y
-*-z-*■ or -«-w*
U V U V
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As in the case with expressions beginning with logical symbols, the
interpreter tries to evaluate expressions beginning with arithmetic
symbols in a call--by~need manner. That is, the interpreter tries
to apply arithmetic items to arithmetic expressions, evaluating an
argument only if it is necessary to effect the application. However,
it will turn out that arguments which did not need to be evaluated in
order to apply an item, will often be evaluated. Note that this
would not be the case with the logical items, because most logical
items never evaluate their arguments. The exception is the atom
schema which does in fact save the partially evaluated expression for
the use of the unify schema. The reason for this is as follows:
Suppose the interpreter, while trying to apply an item to an expression
(fa,.. a ), evaluates some of the arguments say a, .. a. toIn 1 j
a"" .. a', getting (f a' . . a' a. ,, ..a ). Then suppose that the in-
1 ~j 3 1 3 3+1 n
terpreter finds that it cannot apply that item. If the item is an
arithmetic item, that, is if f is an arithmetic symbol it indicates to
the interpreter that (fa'- . . al a. , ..a ) not (/a, .. a ) is now the
1 13+1 n In
sub-expression to be worked upon. All memory of the original ex¬
pression (fa, .. a ) is now erased, and the interpreter tries to apply1 n
the next arithmetic item in the order listed to the partially evaluated
expression.
The advantage of always working on the partially evaluated ex¬
pression is that the interpreter then avoids evaluating any arithmetic
argument more than once. Because most of the arithmetic items do
cause the evaluation of at least some arguments of an expression, this
is significant. The system is able to always use the partially
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evaluated expression rather than the original one: because what the
arguments a^ .. a_. evaluate to does not depend on f, but only on
whether they are sub-expressions of a goal or an assertion. This
property does not hold in more complicated mathematical domains such
as set theory. Thus whereas the basic interpreter works in a call-
by-need manner, evaluating arguments only when needed, on arithmetic
expressions the interpreter often works in a call by value manner.
That is it often evaluates all the arguments.
The items A47 and A48 are not always available to be used.
These two items are used only as follows: If after evaluating every
formulae in a particular sequent, Q has not been derived, then if
there is a goal equation, A47 is applied once, otherwise If there is
an assertion equation, the interpreter tries to apply A48 once. If
either of these items can be applied then the sequent is re-evaluated
as previously described, otherwise the sequent itself is returned.
In section 2.1 we mentioned that the logical items could be
viewed as being instructions in a database manipulation language. It
turns out that this language is extensible in the sense that new in¬
structions may be defined in terms of the primitive logical ones.
For example A44, the <j>[x - y] goal instruction does not split the
database, create and substitute new skolem constants for z and u,
assert x = z + y and add the goal <f>z to the first database, and assert
x + u = y and add the goal <j>o to the second database. Rather,
<f>Ex - y] simply returns the expression:
(Vz.x = z + y ^ (jiz) A (-]u x + u = y ^ <f>o)
and lets the mathematical interpreter perform all these instructions
31
automatically using its logical items. ,
3. Examples
We give below a number of protocols produced by our theorem
prover while proving various arithmetic theorems. We have listed
on the right the name of the item which was applied to each sequent.
Example AE2: Associativity of Plus
A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C :A30
-+ A + (B + C) = A + (B + C) :A43
e-B+C = B + C :A43
■+ C = C : A43
-> O = o :A19
-+ W
time = 38 millisec.
Example AE13: an example of the importance of case analysis.
-+ (A + B) - C = (A - C) + B - (C - A) :case analysis A44
4-
-+[Vx A = x + C 3 (A + B) - C = x + (B - (C-A))]/\
[■3x A + x = C t> (A + B) - C = o + (B - (C - A))] A
■+ Vx A = x + C (A + B) - C = x + (B - (C - A) ) :->V
-+ A = C + C => (A + B) - C = C + (B - (C - A) )
A = C1 + C -+ (A + B) - C = C + (B - (C - A) ) :=+
-*((C + C) + B) - C = C + (B - (C - (C + C))) :A30
-> C + (C + B) - C = C + (B - (C - (C + C))) :A43
-> (C]L + B) - o = C1 + (B - (C - (C + C)) ) : A41
Cj + B = + (B - (C - (C1 + C) >) :A43
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-> C1 + B = C + (B - (o - C ) ) , :A40
+ C1 + B = C + (B - o) :A28
C1 + B = C + B :A21
•>0 = 0 :A19
^ & :-»-0
"A"
-> 3x A + x = C. 3 . (A + B) - C = o + (B - (C - A) ) :-0
3x A + x. = C -> (A + B) - C = o + (B - (C - A) ) :3+
A + C2 = C -> (A + B) - C = o + (B - (C - A)) :=»
-*• (A + B) - (A + C ) = o + (B - ((A + C ) - A)) :A43
-> B - C2 = o + (B - ((A + C ) - A)) :A43
+ B - C2 = o + (B - (C - o)) :A41
-> B - C2 = o + (B - C ) :A29
B - C2 = B - C2 :A21
->•0 = 0 ;A19
->■ ® :->■ til
time = 151 millisec
Example AF10: The theorem prover discovers that the second hypo¬
thesis of this theorem ' B^C' is not needed. In other words that:
A^C A - B = (C - B) - (C - A)
is a theorem. A general rule for discovering irrelevant hypotheses
is this:
If a descendent of a hypotheses occurs in every sequent in the
proof and if no such descendent is n and an assertion: and if no
such descendent is E8 and a goal, and if the Unify and Atom rule£ are
not used then the hypothesis is irrelevant.
33
A^C A B^C 3 A - B = (C - B) - (C - A) :->■ IP
A =s C A B ^ C ->■ A - B = (C - B) - (C - A) :A^"
A ^ C, B C -> A - B = (C - B) - (C - A)
_ :A6
]uA + u = C, B^C->A-B = (C-B) - (C - A) :3->
A + C = C, B ^ C A - B = (C - B) - (C - A)
B ^ A + ->- A - B = ( (A + C^) - B) -- ( (A + C ) - A) :A^
3u B + u = A + C]L -> A - B = ( (A + C^) - B) - ( (A + C ) - A) :3->
B + C2 = A + C1 A - B = ( (A + C ) - B) - ( (A + C ) - A) :A43
B + C2 = A + C1 -> A - B = ( (A + C1) - B) - (C - O) :A41
B + C2 = A + C -> A - B = ((A + Cx) ~ B) - C :A42
B + C2=A + Cl->A-B = (A + C ) - (B + C ) :A43
B + C2=A + C1->A-B=A-B :A21
B + C2 = A + C -»• o = o :A19
B + C2 = A + C -> P3 :-»• Eg
time = 76' millisec
Example AM7: The Law of De Morgan
1
->-[Vx 1 = x + A 3 1- (A + B) = x* (1 - B) ] A







C1 = OAA=1->1-(A + B)=C * (1 - B) : /\->-
C1 = o, A = 1 ->■ 1 - (A + B) = C • (1 - B)
A = 1 -> 1 - (A + B) = o (1 - B) :=*->-
-> 1 1 (1 + B) = o • (1 - B) :A43
-> O - B = o • (1 - B) . :A40
-> o = o • (1 - B) :A33
-> o = o :A19
-> ® m
"B"
C1 = 1 A A = o -*• 1 - (A + B) = C • (1 - B) : A -*
C1 = 1, A = o -> 1 - (A + B) = C • (1 - B) :=-*
A = o -> 1 - (A + B) = 1 • (1 - B) '
-> 1 - (o + B) = 1 • (1 - B) :A29
1 - B = 1 • (1 - B) :A35
-*1-B = 1- B : A21
-> o = o :A19
**■81 :*> 13i
"C"
->3xl+x = A01-(A + B)=o» (1 - B) :*>!D
3x 1 + x = A -> 1 - (A + B) = o • (1 - B) : 3-s-
1 + C = A 1 - (A + B) = o • (1 - B) : =->
-* 1 - ( (1 + C ) + B) = o • (1 - B) :A30
*> 1 - (1 + (C + B) = o • (1 - B) :A43
-> O - (C + B) ' = o • (1 - B) :A40
o = o • (1 - B) :A33
o = o :A19
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time = 189 millisec
Example AM32: No even number equals any odd number. ■ We did not
think that the theorem prover would be able to prove this theorem.
In fact, we did not think that this theorem was implied by the items
used by the theorem prover, since induction is not one of them.
-+ i> 2-A = (2-B) + 1
2-A = (2•B) + 1 +- :A7
(Si) • A = (2-B) + 1 -y :A1
(1+1) - A = (2-B) +1+- :A37
(1-A) + (1-A) = (2 • B) + 1 •+ :A35
A + (1-A) = (2-B) + 1 -+ :A34
A+A = (2-B) + 1 -+ :A7
A+A = ( (SI) • B) +l-»- :A1
A+A = ((1+1)-B) +1+- :A37
A+A = ( (1-B) + (1-B)) + 1 +• :A35
A+A = (B+(l-B)) + 1 +• :A34
A+A = (B+B) + 1 -> : A31
A+A = 1+(B+B) -y :magnitude
heuristic A48
[3u A+u=l A (B+B)+u=A] V [3w l+w=A A A+w=B+B]-> : V->
3u A+u = 1 A (B+B) + u = A -> :3->
A+Cx = 1 A (B+B) + C1 = A -> : A +"
A+C;l = 1, (B+B) + C± = A '+• :A13
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(A=o A cj_=1) V (A=l A C^=o) , (B+BJ+C^ = A -+ :V •>
A=0 AC^l, (B+B)+C =A ■+
A=o, c1=lf (B+B)+C =A -+
C1=l, (B+B) +C =o ->
(B+B) +l=o ->
1+ (B+B) =0 +•







A=1 A C1=o/ (B+B)+C1=A -+
A=l, <^=0, (B+B)+C =A -+
C =0, (B+B)+C =1
(B+B)+o=l ->
0+ (B+B) =1. -+
A->
:A-> B+B=l






3w 1+w = A A A+w = B+B -+
1+C2 = A A A+C = B+B
:-3-+
: A->
1+C2 = A, A+C2 = B+B -+
(1+C2) + C2 = B+B -> : A31
C2+(l+C2) = B+B -+ :magnitude
heuristic A48
(•3u C2+U=B a B+u=1+C2) V (3w B+W=C2 a (1+C2)+w=B) -+ : V -+
]u C2+u=B A B+u=1+C ->
C2+C3=B A B+C3=l+C2 -+
:3"^" 3w B+W=C2 A (1+C2) +w=B •+ : ]->•
:A "+• B+C4=C2 A (1+C2)+C4=B ■> :A->
W®' B+S=1+C2 " B+C4=C2' (1+c2)+C4=B *
(C2+C3)+C3=1+C2 * :A31 (1+(B+C ) )+C4=B -> :A31
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C3+(C2+C3)=1+C2 :A21 C4+(1+(B+C4) )=B ^ :A21
C3+C3=1 "* :A13 C4+(1+C4):=0 :A9
(C0=o A C_,= l) V (C^ = l A C0=o) -> :V-> C4=o A 1+c4=° ^ :/n->
C =o, 1+C =o -> :
4 4
l+o=o -*• :A28
C3=oAC3=1 -> :A"> C =1AC ==o l-o -> :A18
c3=°, C =1 -> :=■»■ C3=1' C3=0 n :a
0=1 ->■ :A17 1=0 ■> :A18
n -> :n -> n -> :n ->
time = 432 millisec
Note that the magnitude heuristic A48 is applied each time to essentially
the same formulae, but with a different parenthesization and commutation.
4. Results
In order to meet our objective we decided to make a detailed
empirical study of the deductive ability of this theorem prover in
comparison to the ability of an arithmetic theorem prover based on
diagrams and forward chaining. The theorem prover we compared ours
to, called SUMS by its author, is described in [20, 21]*. We ran
all 87 theorems that SUMS had attempted to prove up to the time of
IJCAI3. A summary of the results obtained by both theorem provers
is given in Figure 2. Individual results for each of the 87 test
theorems are given in Figure 3. All times in Figure 3 are given in
milliseconds. If '(fail)' appears beside a time, it means that the
theorem prover took that much time trying to prove the theorem before
deciding to quit.
* A re-appraisal of SUMS, in view of this research, is given in [23].
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Figure 2: Summary of Results
SUMS
Our System Memo 61 IJCAI3
Oct. 1974 Feb.1973*** Aug.1973*** 21 Sept.1973
Proven 86 20 64 70
Failed 1* 0 22 16
Untried O 67 1 O
cpu time
(sec)**
14 (DEC10,KA10) — — 442(ICL4130)
* Due to an overflow on an internal stack of the LISP system while
trying to prove 200+200 = 400. This was caused by the fact
that the theorem prover represents numerals in unary notation.
** Our DEC10 is about 3 times faster than the ICL4130.
*** Date of publication of memo. Actual runs were made some time
sooner.
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Figure 3: Individual Results
Theorem
AE1: A + B = B + A
AE2: A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C
AE3: P (A - B) = PA - B
AE4: SA - SB = A - B
AE5: (A + C) - (B + C) = A - C
AE6: A - (A + B) = o
AE7: 1 - SA = o
AE8: 1 - (1 - SA) = 1
AE9: A + (B - A) = B + (A - B)
AE10: A - (A - B) = B - (B - A)
AE11: A - (B + C) = (A - B) - C
AE12: (A - B) - C = (A - C) - B
AE13: (A + B) - C = (A - C) + (B -
AE14: A - B £ A
AE15: A - (A - B) ^ A
AE16: A - (A - B) ^ B
AE17: A ^ A + (B - A)
AE18: B ^ A + (B - A)
AE19: o ^ SA
AE20: A ^ SA















































A^BABS-Ats A = B 96
A^B3B = A+(B-A) 38
B = A + C3A^B 56
A<BAB=$C3AS$C 94
SA ^ SB 3 A $ B 114
A = B => SA = SB 57
A$BAC$D75A + C^B + D 94
A^BA C^DOA-D^B-C 227
C $ B 3 A - (B - C) = (A + C) - B 75
A$CAB$C3A-B = (C 1 B) 1
(C - A) 76
A^BdA=A- (A - B) 57
B < A V A ^ B 76
A^B+->A<BV A = B 999*GC
A =$ B •<-> A ^ SB A ^A = SB 284
A = o) 3 PA < A A A = SPA 433
A « B'A B < C 3 A < C 113
A<BAB^C3A<C 109
A < B -<-> SA < SB 150
A<BAC^D3A + C < B + D 111
A<BAB^Ct5C-B<C-A 132
A + B < C <—> A < C - B 226
A<B3^B=o 38






















































0 • A - o
1 • A = A
A • B = B • A
(A • B) • C = A • (B • C)
A • (B + C) = (A • B) + (A • C)
A • (B - C) = (A • B) - (A • C)
1. - (A + B) = (1 - A) • (1 - C)
(1 - (A • B) ) • B = (1 - A) • B
A ^ B A C^DO.A'C^B-D
A < B A C<D3A-C<B*D
('v A = o) A (^ B = o) 3 'VA«B = o
('v B = o) .3 A ^ A • B
CvC = o)AA<B3 A • C < B • C
A = B«CA(^C = o)3 B < A
2 ^ a a 2^b75 a + b^a'b
B = A • C 3 a|b
aIo
A | A • B
11 A
B a BiC 3 A|C
ba ^ b = o 3 a^b
A 3 A = o
1 3 A = 1




















































time (ms) SUMS-time (ms)
am26: a|b "=> a|b • c 53 1,438
am27: a|b a a|c o a|b+c 93 1,500 (fail)
am28: a|b a a|c a|b 1 c 94 3,813 (fail)
am29: a|b a c|d r> (a • c) | (b • D) , 94 2,938 (fail)
am30: a|b d a • c | b • c 75 2,375
am31: a|ba a|sb a = 1 2,145*gc 3,250 (fail)
am32: 'v 2 • a = (2 • b) + 1 432 10,250 (fail)
(6,362) (.141,310)
aev1: 0II0+0 23 1,000
aev2: 0II0•o 37 375
aev3 : 0 • I—1 II 0 19 875
aev4: 2 + 2 = 4 75 3,436
aev5: 200 + 200 = 400 [time lost due to failing]*GC 2,938
aev7 : (a + 2) • (a + 3) = a • A + 5 • A + 6 264 •40,440 (fail)
aev8: 2 $ a a a < 4 +->• a = 2 v a = 3 496 20,130 (fail)
aev9: a + a = 2 'a 37 2,438
aevio: A + (A + A) = 3 • A 57 2,938 (fail)
aev11: 2 $ 5 96 1,938
aev12: a ^ 2 a 5j=b3 a^b 255 4,813
(1,431) (85,321)
TOTALS: 13,533 ms 442,761 ms
apx 14 sec apx 442 sec
or 7 minutes
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*GC - means a LISP garbage collection occurred.
Notes for Figure 3
(1) AE17 may be generalized to A ^ A + C.
(2) AFlO's second hypothesis is not needed.
(3) No less than 17 of these theorems follow as logical instances
of the items. AE1, 2, 11, AMI, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23,
24, AEV1, 2,3. As many of these arithmetic items are more or less
embodied, in the code of the SUMS theorem prover [20, 21], one may
wonder just in what sense our theorem prover and SUMS can be said to
have proven these theorems, for normally one wishes to prove theorems,
by assuming only simpler more perceivable truths as lemmas. This is
a major reason for the doctrine of extensibility [24]; which implies
that we must not implicitly assume a lemma while trying to prove it.
This doctrine is described in the next chapter.
It will be apparent from Figures 2 and 3 that on these test
examples, superior results were obtained by our theorem prover.
These superior results were due to our theorem prover's use of list
notation and truth value preserving transformations. To see why
this is true it is first necessary to have some understanding as to
how SUMS proves theorems.
The basic idea behind SUMS is that theorems should be proven as
follows: First the hypotheses of the theorem should be represented
as a semantic net, in such a manner that the skolem constants of
the formulas become nodes, and the predicates become the arcs.. For
example, if the theorem were :
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A$B/\ B ^ C A ^ C
the hypothesis A ^ B would first be represented as:
Note that A ^ B iff there exists an E such that A + E = B. Thus
SUMS actually uses the relation + E to state that A ^ B. E is just
a new skolem constant.
The hypothesis B ^ C is next added to the net resulting in:
.—. +E <~\ "IE@> #fB)— }(cj
j,—' yr
+&/ +B
Having represented all the hypotheses, SUMS now begins a process
of creating new relations by applying general arithmetic laws to the
hypotheses. For example, the transitivity law is applied to the
facts: (a)—i?- yb) , (b)—— i resulting in a new diagram:
+(E+F)
and (b}-»-+F S<C) .
After a while this process of forward chaining is stopped, and
the system tries to access the conclusion of the theorem in the net.
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For example, for the above theorem the system tries to access the
fact that A ^ C, or rather the fact that there exists an X such
+(E+F)
that A -I- X = C. Since (A) —— «t<C) is in the net the system
succeeds in proving the theorem.
There are two points about the techniques used in SUMS which
have been thought to be particularly important. The first is that
SUMS uses what has been called "controlled" forward chaining;
controlled in the sense that although new relations such as +(E-fF)
are created by forward chaining, no new terms (nodes) are ever
created. This has been said to greatly limit the size of the
space searched.
The second point thought to be important is the use of the
semantic net data structure. The idea is that if most of the
deduction carried out in the system is forward chaining, then a data
structure in which one can go directly to the next property via a
node will be quite useful. For example, the transitivity law after
going from A to B collecting +E, is already at B and thus
merely uses the +F arc to go to C , thus collecting +F and creating
the new arc +(E+F).
Having now described the diagram and forward chaining method
used by SUMS we now compare this to an arithmetic theorem prover
based on list notation, and truthvalue preserving transformations.
First the semantic net representation of SUMS is redundant in
that every hypothesis is represented twice. In our above example
A ^ B is represented both as (A)— -£(b) and as (e)— £'{b) .
When forward chaining this redundancy means that there will be
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alternate ways of deducing each new fact. In the above net, using
the transitivity law'we derive:
(a) S^c) or rather a + E + F = C
and
u(cj or rather • E + A + F = C
which are simply two different ways of saying that A $ C.
Granted then that the particular representation of formulas
used by SUMS is redundant, and that maybe a net representation like:
y@>
©'
should have been used, was there any point in using semantic nets as
opposed to the traditional list notation in the first place? The
simple fact is this: typical theorems of number theory do not •
involve lengthy property chains such as:
A ^ A A A $ A A A A ^ A
1223 n-1 n
Thus no significant time could be gained by having explicit pointers
for properties. Furthermore, the use of a semantic network data
structure makes many simple logical laws, very time-consuming to
perform: For example, consider the formulae of the form:
T -* (A 3 B) A (C O D)
where T is the current semantic net. We would like to split on the
A sign getting:
r -> (A T> B) and T -> (C I? D)
and then:
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r, A B and r, C -> D
But if F is a semantic net, then F must be duplicated on the
split because later A must be put into one net while C must be put
into the other net. If the traditional list representation had been
used then all this would have been automatic
_ because F would not have
to be copied.
Beyond this redundancy in the way facts are represented in the
net, there is an even worse redundancy caused by the arithmetic laws
used to do the forward chaining. In our previous example, when we
forward chain from: (AV— Kb) ——£<C) to get the new fact:
+ (E+F) x---(a)—-—„— the two previous facts are not deleted, but remain
in the net. Since A + E = BAB + F = C is equivalent to A + E + F = C,
this amounts to two ways of sayi'ng the same thing. Note that this
redundancy caused by forward chaining means that the semantic net will
grow continuously throughout the course of the proof.
This redundancy is eliminated in a system based on truthvalue
preserving transformations, in that the previous expressions may be
deleted, because we know that the resulting expression is equivalent
to the previous one. For example,applying the item = to the first
equation of:
A + E = B, B + F = C->A^C
gives:
(A + E) + F = C-+A^C
applying = -> to the second equation gives:
A $ A + E + F
which is true. Note that our system discards each equation after
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using it once and only once, never redundantly. Thus it is quite
typical for the number of such equations in our sequents to decrease
during the course of proving a theorem, even to the extent that when
0 is finally produced it is the only formula in the sequent.
Having now shown how redundant forward chaining is, let us
consider the question of "controlled" forward chaining. We point
out that the "control" which in this case is simply a bcin on the
creation, of new terms (nodes) not already occurring in the theorem,
is irrelevant because all it does is make an arbitrary (random if
you like) pruning of the search space.
Just as an example of how irrelevant is this ban, consider the
theorem AF7.
AF7: A^BAC^D->-Ad-C^Bd-D
In Figure 4 we display the semantic net that SUMS would have
produced after examining the hypotheses and the sub-expressions of
the goal. Note that expressions of the form A ^ B are treated as
,if they were A + u = B where u is a new constant. The net repre¬
sentation of this last statement is (A)—- 0b) and also
0—L 0B) .
SUMS fails to prove this theorem because given its ban on
creating new nodes, there is no way it can produce an arc from
A + C to B + D. If, however, SUMS had a rule which- could reverse
node x and arc label y in (x) 0) to get (0 —0)) , thus
possibly creating a new node y, a proof of this theorem could have
been obtained. In Figure 5 such a net is shown where in step 1
(A) ~ 0B + Dp has been reversed to create a new node (u + J5) .
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Figure 4: Semantic net for theorem AF7
U + D
where
v is D - C
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Figure 5: Semantic net for AF7 with arc reversal
u + D
3. Chaining on arcs v and 2.
where
4. Chaining on arcs 1 and 3.
5. Chaining on arcs A and 4.
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Then by comparing nodes and chaining an arc from (A + C) to (b + D)
is finally produced. Note that if new nodes such as Cu + 3} could
be automatically created only when needed, then a ban on the creation
of just such nodes is obviously irrelevant.
The question, of course, remains as to how SUMS could choose
just what new nodes to create, that is just what arcs to reverse.
For example,in Figure 4 all of the arcs
u+D, a + D, C+B, v + B
would appear to be potential candidates. With this question in
mind, let us examine the protocol produced by our theorem prover in
Figure 6. The (1) sequent corresponds to the semantic net of
Figure 4. The (2) sequent corresponds to the semantic net of
Figure 5 just after the u + D has been created. Note that the term
u + D has just been created in this sequent, and the production of
££ immediately follows.
Thus, we have answered our question - our theorem-prover gives
us a method of creating the new nodes which are necessary in order
to prove this theorem. It follows then, that a ban on creating
just such nodes is completely irrelevant.
In summary we can say that not only does our theorem prover
delete arcs and nodes (i.e. formulas and terms) when they are no
longer necessary (For example, the hypotheses of sequents (1) and
(2) in Figure 6 are deleted in the succeeding steps), but also it
automatically creates the new nodes (i.e. terms) which are necessary
in order to prove the theorem.
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Figure 6: Proof of theorem AF7
->A^BAC^D-2>A + C^B + D :■+ 3
A ^ B A CiSD + A + C^B + D :A+-
A^B, C^D->-A + C$B + D :A6
3 U A+u = B, C^D+-A + C^B + D
A + u = B, C$D-+A-+C^B + D :A6
A + u = B, 5vC+v = D+ A + C.^B + D :3-+
(1) A + u = B, C + v = D->-A + C^B + D :=+
1
C + V = D->A + C^ (A + u) + D :A21
(2) C + v = D-+C^u + D :=+
4-
-+ C «; u + (C + v) :A21
(3) ■+ o ^ u + v
(1) Corresponds to the semantic net of Figure 4.
(2.) Corresponds to the semantic net of Figure 5, after adding
the u + D node by arc node reversal.
(3) o^u+vis now the only formulae in the sequent.
Note: This protocol is a slight permutation of the one actually
obtained by our theorem prover.
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5. Implementation
The short implementation time (17 days) is due to the use of
our interpreter for mathematical symbols, which provided a uniform
method of allowing our items of mathematical knowledge to interact
with the sub-formulas of the theorem being proven. This allowed us
to code small numbers of related items together as a module which
was independent of any other items in the system, and independent of
any particular sub-formulae of the theorem being proven.
Our interpreter for mathematical symbols is implemented in 342
lines of LISP [18] source code. The items of mathematical knowledge
are encoded as either schemata of our mathematical language or as
LISP functions. The logical items are implemented in 531 lines of
LISP source code and the arithmetic items, with the exception of a
few definitions encoded as schemata, are implemented in 336 lines of
LISP source code.
In the case of items implemented as schemata, our mathematical
interpreter, using its pattern matching facilities, works more or
less as described in section 2. But in the case of an item encoded
in a LISP function the interpreter passes the expression it is
evaluating to that LISP function, and expects an equivalent, or
equal, expression to be returned.
For example, in Figure 7 we. display the LISP function NUMIN
which encodes the four items: A40, A41, A42, A43, for the funny
minus symbol: - . Note that NUMIN returns either the result of
applying one of these items, or the expression it was given if none
of the items can be applied.
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Figure 7: LISP function encoding items A40, A42, A43.
(DEFPROP NUMIN (LAMBDA (X) ( PROG (XI X2 Y)
! X has fornflfcxi -- X2
(SETQ Y (PCANCEL (CDR X)))
(SETQ XI (CAR Y) )
(SETQ X2 (CADR Y))
(COND((EQUAL XI @ (ZERO)) (RETURN XI))
I A40: o - a = o
((EQUAL X2 @ (ZERO)) (RETURN XI))
! A41: a - o = a
((ATOM XI) (GO N4))
((EQ (CAR X1)@MINUS) (RETURN (LOGEVAL
(LIST @MINUS (CADR XI) (LIST @PLUS (CADDR XI) X2)) )) )
) I A42: (a - b) - c = a - (b + c)
N4 (RETURN (COND ((EQ Y (CDR X)) X)
I return input X
(T (CONS @MINUS Y)) ))
)) EXPR) I A44
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Just as an example of how modular 'the theorem prover is, notice
that just before returning to the mathematical interpreter the result
of applying the item A43; an explicit recursive call passing that
result to the interpreter is made:
Since this result begins with the minus symbol a recursive call to
NUMIN is also made. The LISP function NUMIN is not directly accessed,
but only, indirectly via the minus symbol. This is a general property
of our theorem prover": All items are accessed via mathematical
symbols, never through the LISP code. This makes our theorem prover
extremely modular in that items or groups of items encoded in a LISP
function may be added or deleted without ever affecting the rest of
the theorem prover. For example, further items for the minus symbol
could be added without ever changing the NUMIN function.
The run time structure of the theorem prover is as follows:
(IK is 2"*"° words of core memory) .
(LOGEVAL (LIST @ MINUS .,. ))
LISP interpreter: 9K
Mathematical Interpreter
and Logical items: 6K
Arithmetic items: 2K
The 87 test theorems: 2K
Free cells: UK
3OK
Most of the LISP functions are compiled.
56
6. Conclusion
We have compared an arithmetic theorem prover based on list
notation and truth value preserving transformations with an arith¬
metic theorem prover based on semantic nets and forward chaining,
and have found the first to be superior. We have also given an
explanation to account for this result. This provides reasonable
evidence that semantic nets and forward chaining are not very use¬
ful for proving theorems in this domain. It also supports the
view that list-notation and truth value preserving transformations
are xiseful for proving theorems in elementary number theory.
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^ Extensible Deductive Knowledge System
1. Introduction
Contemporary research, such as that described in Chapters
II and II, towards the automation of mathematical reasoning ignores
certain fundamental problems. For although great improvements have
been made in the construction of theorem provers for particular
mathematical domains such as pure LISP, logic, arithmetic, set
theory, topology, analysis and elementary algebra, research along
these lines does not in itself explain the mathematical ability
to create improved deductive systems. In particular, such
research provides no explanation as to how domain dependent
mathematical knowledge is acquired or even justified.
We believe that the ability of a mathematical system to
improve its deductive capabilities by the acquisition of more
sophisticated mathematical techniques is a prerequisite of
realistic mathematical reasoning. In particular, we argue that
significant improvement in deductive ability of automatic theorem
provers presupposes the construction of deductive systems which
make use of domain-dependent mathematical knowledge and which can
justify the results of using such knowledge in terms of the axioms
of the given domain.
In the remainder of this Chapter we will analyze these problems,
and try to outline a research programme aimed at solving these
problems.
2. Analysis of Research Objectives
We first describe two possible objectives for research on the
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automation of deductive reasoning: ,
1. The first objective is to construct a program to
determine if a sentence can be proven from the axioms
of a theory.
2. The second objective is to construct a program to
explain why, in terms of the given axioms of a theory,
a sentence can be proven from those axioms.
Consider for example a theory consisting of the following
axioms:
Al: (x+y)+z = x+(y+z) associativity
A2: x+y = y+x comrnutativity
A3: z+y = x+z ■*->• y=z cancellation
We could build a very efficient theorem prover for this theory,
which instead of using those axioms to prove theorems, uses the
following procedure:
PI: Cancel like variables on opposite sides of the equality
sign.
with the strategic information that whenever PI Is used the old
equation is to be erased.
Such a theorem prover would satisfy objective 1 because this
procedure is essentially a derived rule of inference of the theory
consisting of axioms Al, A2 and A3.
For example, a proof that a+(b+c) = c+(b+a) is a theorem
using this procedure could be obtained as follows:
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a+(b+c) = c+(b+a)
+ by PI (cancel a)
b+c = c+b




This theorem prover does not satisfy objective 2 because the
inference steps in this proof are not justified in terms of the
primitive axioms of the theory, but only in terms of PI. However,
a theorem prover for this theory which also satisfies objective 2
could be obtained by substituting equals for equals using the axioms











Now it is easy to verify that a deductive system which embodies
extra mathematical knowledge in terms of lemmas, procedures like PI
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and the strategic knowledge as to how to use those lemmas and
procedures, has the potential for being more efficient at proving
theorems than systems which do not. For example, the first theorem
prover we described which embodies the procedure PI, proves
a+(b+c) = c+(b+a) without any search. On the other hand, the
second theorem prover which uses only the axioms Al, A2, and A3
involves search due to superfulous applications of the axioms.
For example, all of the following seven sentences, six of which are
superfulous, are obtainable from the theorem a+(b+c) = c+(b+a) by a
single application of one of the axioms:
(a+b)+c = c+(b+a) by Al
a+(b+c) = (c+b)+a by Al
(b+c)+a = c+(b+a) by A2
a+(c+b) = c+(b+a) by A2
a+(b+c) = (b+a)+c by A2
a+(b+c) = c+(a+b) by A2
x+(a+(b+c)) = x+(c+b+a)) by A3
Note that if the second theorem prover had some fairly sophis¬
ticated search strategic knowledge which restricted the use of the
associativity and commutativity axioms so as to directly lead to the
use of the cancellation axiom, then, there might very well have been
no search. The problem with such strategies in a more complex
theorem proving system, is that out of all the many possible
strategies how does the theorem prover know which one to apply to
which expression? f Suppose for each strategy we had some very
efficient method of testing whether it should be used on the given
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expression, then it follows that our problem would be solved. The
question remains as to just what are the efficient methods? The
answer is that these methods are simply items of extra mathematical
knowledge. For example in the case of the sophisticated search
strategy that we gave for the second theorem prover, an efficient
method to determine whether it should be used is simply the procedure
PI.
In the remainder of this paper we shall continue to speak of
items rather than complex strategies for what is important is not the
mere existence of various strategies but rather the methods of
determining when a particular strategy should be used. Since every
search space including the one produced by adding various items,
involves some strategic considerations, we' shall reserve the word
'strategy' for this purpose. However, these strategies will not be
very complex and will have simple, even obvious methods of determining
when they should be used. An example of such a strategy was the
erase strategy used in conjunction with PI.
Given then, that the most efficient deductive systems embody
extra mathematical knowledge such as the procedure PI; and that
while such systems trivially satisfy objective 1, a certain amount of
extra effort must be made if such systems are also to satisfy object¬
ive 2; one may well wonder if there is any purpose at all in requir¬
ing objective 2 to be satisfied. That extra programming effort must
be made in order for such systems to satisfy objective 2 can be seen
from the fact that extra mathematical knowledge such as lemmas and
procedures such as PI would have to be justified in some sense from
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the axioms of the theory. For example, lemmas could be justified
by proving them using only the axioms of the theory, but what about
procedures written in LISP or machine code? We leave this technical
question until section 2 and now state why deductive systems should
satisfy objective 2 in the first place.
The reason is this: any theorem prover not continually able to
increase it's mathematical knowledge, such as lemmas, procedures, and
strategies will quickly reach a plateau in the level of difficulty of
theorems it can prove, after which a combinatorial explosion must
occur in it's search space.
Consider, for example, some logical system with equality, such
as resolution with paramodulation; with a two sorted theory consisting
of Tarski's axioms of real numbers and Peano's axioms of number theory.





3 4 3 2
]x 3y 3z 3u 3v Vn (Z k = x«n +y*n +z*n +u°n+v)
k=l
very difficult indeed.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to implement a more
knowledgeable algebra-number thoery theorem prover, embodying about
70 lemmas, strategies, and procedures which could easily prove the
above theorem. In fact our algebra number-theory system [28] proves
this theorem in about 24 seconds. Of course, since this theorem
prover cannot itself further increase its mathematical knowledge, it
too soon reaches a plateau in the level of difficulty of theorems it
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can prove. For example, it is unable to prove the theorem:
n p+1
Vp 3X Vn E kP = E (Xj)*n3
k=l j=o
Having now exemplified the fact that a mathematical system must
be able to increase its mathematical knowledge, it is easy to see
why its deductive component must satisfy objective 2. For consider,
if objective 2 were not required to be satisfied how would our program
itself be able to tell if the mathematical knowledge it was adding to
its deductive component, were correct or even consistent with the
original axioms of the theory. For example, in the theory consisting
of axioms Al, A2, and A3, what would there be to stop a procedure
such as P2 from being acquired:
P2: Cancel unlike variables on opposite sides of the
equality sign.
Note that whereas PI was essentially a derived rule of inference
of this theory, P2 is not. For whereas a+b = a+b is true in this
fragment of arithmetic, applying P2 to it gives the sentence a = b
(i.e. VaVb a = b) which is false in arithmetic.
In summary, the goal of our research programme, in respect to
deductive reasoning, is to construct deductive systems which
(1) make use of extra mathematical knowledge (eventually
to be created by other components of the mathematical
system). (That is to make use of efficient methods of
calculating which strategies should be used on which
expressions.)
and
(2) satisfy objective 2.
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For example, we would like to have a theorem prover as
knowledgeable, and hence efficient, as our algebra-number theory
program, but which could justify it's proofs in terms of the Peano
and Tarski axioms.
3. Definition of ■ an Extensible ■'Deductlta System
How is it possible to construct deductive systems which use
extra mathematical knowledge, and yet which satisfy objective 2?
We intend to realize this goal by constructing extensible deductive
systems:
An extensible deductive system is a theorem prover which start¬
ing from some system of axioms justifies more and more items of extra
mathematical knowledge such as lemmas and procedures, one after
another, creating ever more knowledgeable theorem provers. That is,
after each such item is justified, it itself is organized into the
deductive system, and is used in justifying further items.
For example, an extensible deductive system resulting in our
algebra-number theory theorem prover could be obtained as follows:
(see Fig. 1) let I,...I be all the items of extra mathematical
In
knowledge in our algebra-number theory program. Each Ij will be
representable in our mathematical language and hence by definition
is a lemma, not a procedure. However, for the purposes of justific¬
ation procedures are easily represented in our mathematical language.
For example, the procedure Pi could be represented as being the lemma
which is the conjunction of the axioms Al, A2, and A3. Let the
theorem prover T_.^ ^ be obtained from the theorem prover T by organ¬
izing into the system the item after justifying using T .
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Figure 1: Example of Extensible Deductive System
Theorem Provers
TO: Logic + Tarski and Peano axioms
/
(Justify II)















T^: Our Algebra-Number Theory Program
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It is important to understand that organizing an item into the system
means a lot more than merely adding another sentence to some data base.
In particular it means that knowledge about how and when the item is
to be used is created and added to the system. For example, in the
case of the lemma version of the procedure PI (i.e. the conjunction
of axioms Al, A2, and A3) what we want to create and add is an
efficient LISP function to do the cancellation along with relevant
information expressed in LISP as to when the system should attempt
to use this function.- Note that by allowing the full power of a
language like LISP, it is not very difficult to represent strategic
knowledge as to how to use items. Then by letting T be a theorem
prover for logic including equality with the Tarski and Peano axioms,
it follows that T^ will be our algebra-number theory program. Further¬
more, the spectrum of theorem provers <T ... T > will form an ex-
o n
tensible deductive system resulting in T . ThAt is any further
theorem proven by will be justifiable, via eventually
in terms of the primitive axioms of T .
In order to experimentally test these ideas, last year we im¬
plemented a prototype extensible deductive system* for a small portion
of the set theory given in Quine's book Set Theory and its Logic [1],
The initial theorem prover T of this extensible system consisted of
o
a sequent calculus with equality, and about 30 axioms and definitions.
A few of these definitions are listed below: (Note that {u:<}>u} is the
abstract of all things: u such that <J>u holds; {x}, {xy}, <xy> are the unit-
set,pairset, and ordered pair respectively; and {<xy>:<f>xy} is the
* This system is described in detail in Chapter V.
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abstract for all ordered pairs such that ij>xy holds.)
D1: x e{u:<}>u} tf>x
D2: {x} = {z:z=x}
D3: {x,y} = {z:z=x V z=y}
D4: <x,y> = {{x} {xy}}
D5: {<xy>:<£xy} = {z: 3x3y <xy> - z A ijixy}
D6: x=y Vz zex -«-»• zey
Succeeding theorem provers Tj+-j_ were obtained by organizing into
the system certain given lemmas that had been proven using the
preceding theorem prover T . Such items in the system were lemmas
not procedures. Furthermore, the actual process of organizing was
not automated. Instead the organized LISP representation of each
lemma was initially given, but not used until automatically activated
by a proof of that lemma. These lemmas are used in a manner similar
to definitions by replacing what matches the left side of the equiv¬
alence by that instance of the right side. Furthermore, when several
items might be applied to a sentence, the system prefers to use the
least primitive item, usually the one justified last. Thus, defin¬
itions are used only if no other item could be used. A few of the
lemmas in our set theory system are given below:
II: x = x -e-> 68
12: {x} = {y} -<-> x = y
13: {xy} = {z} -*->■ x = z A y = z
14: {z} = {zy} ■<->■ z = x A z = y
15: {xy} = {uv} -f-*(x = uAy = v)V (x = v A y = u)
16: £xy> = <uv> x = u A y = v
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17: <xy> e {<uv>:<|>uv} ■*->- <j>xy
Consider now the proof of lemma 17 using the theorem prover T6.
From Figure 2 we see that two of the inference steps in this proof
were obtained by using the lemma 16. Thus this proof is not
immediately in terms of the primitive axioms of this set theory.
However, since 16 was proven from T5 using 12, 13, 14, and 15, and
since each of these lemmas was proven using only Tl, and since II
was proven from the primitive axiom, namely TO, it follows that the
lemma 17 has actually been justified in terms of the primitive axiom
of this theory.
Note that items of extra mathematical knowledge such as lemmas
II, . .., 17 play an indispensable role in the deductive process not
only because they cut down the sheer length of the proof of a theorem,
but also because they cut down the possibilities of interaction be¬
tween various subformulas of a theorem. For example, in the proof
of 17 given in Figure 2, if the lemma 16 had not been used then the
theorem prover would have had to show that various instances of 16
held; namely that <ab> = <cd> was equivalent toa=cAb=d and
that <ab> = <*±*2> WaS e<3u^valent to a = * Ab = * . Not only does
this make the proof of 17 much longer but also the proofs of those
instances of 16 must be carried out in the presence of sentences
such as: Fab, Ted, ^*^*2* If T were a large complex sentence, it is
easy to see that there would be many possibilities of interaction be¬
tween it and the intermediate formulas produced when proving the
(
instances of 16. Continuing in this fashion, if the use of further
lemmas is disallowed, say for example lemmas 12, 13, 14, and 15
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Figure 2: Proof of lemma 17 using Io
VxVy <xy> e {<uv>: Fuv} -*-»• Fxy
-> Vy <ay> e {<uv>: Fuv} -*-> Tay
<ab> E {<uv>: Fuv} -*->■ Fab
A- ~
<ab> e {<uv>: Tuv} -*• Tab D5
<ab> e{z: 3u3v z = <uv> A Fab} -> T :D1 '
3u3v <ab> = <uv> A Fuv Tab :3-»-
3v <ab> = <cv> A rev Tab :-]->■
<ab> = <cd> A Fed ■> Fab : A-*
<ab> = <cd>, Fed -> Fab :I6
a = c A b = d, Fed Fab : A ->
a = c, b = d, Ted -* Fab :=->■






Fab -> <ab> e {<uv>:Fuv} :D5
Tab •> <ab> e {z:3u3v z = <uv> A Fuv} :D1
Tab •+ 3u3v<ab> = <uv> A Fuv :->3
Fab -> 3v<ab> = <*lv> A F*lv :->3
Tab -> <ab> = <*1*2> A F*l*2 :-V\
Tab -> <ab> = <*1*2>
Fab -> a = *1 A b = *2
:I6
:->A
Tab -> F*l*2 :Unify
fe- »*•





which were used in proving 16 then the -resulting proof must be even
longer, and there become more and more possibilities of interaction,
eventually creating a combinatorial explosion. On the other hand,
by using items of extra mathematical knowledge such as the lemmas
II...17, the proofs of further theorems in elementary set theory do
not appear to be any longer,or any more difficult to obtain than the
proofs of earlier lemmas.
For. these reasons, it is plausible to suggest that by using
items of extra mathematical knowledge in extensible deductive systems,
that efficient theorem provers satisfying objective 2 can be con¬
structed.
4■ The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge
Given that items of extra mathematical knowledge are an essential
component of extensible deductive systems, the question arises as to
just what are these items? At any given stage of an extensible de¬
ductive system the items are simply the sentences or things which
represent sentences of our formal language, which have previously
been justified, organized as to be easily accessed when relevant to
proving further sentences.
4.1 Accessing Items
, . Consider for example the applications of the items 16 in the
proof of 17 given in Figure 2. Out of all the many items available,
how is it possible for the theorem prover to know that 16 and no
other item is to be used on the sequent below?
<ab> = <cd>, fed Fab
How does the theorem prover know not to use the item II or the
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item 12? Thus obtaining respectively:
Vx x = x, <ab> = <cd>, I'cd -> Fab
or VxVy {x.} = {y} <-*■ x = y, <ab> = <cd>, Fed -> Fab ?
The answer is that item 16 and the sentence <ab> = <cd> contain many
of the same non variable symbols, namely equality and ordered pairs;
and thus are about the same thing, namely the equality of ordered
pairs. The reason that other items are not accessed, is because
they do not share with <ab> = <cd> as many symbols as does 16, and
thus are probably not.as relevant.
In our set theory program, the mechanics of accessing 16 were
more or less as follows: First; <ab> = <cd> and the left side of
16 were observed to have the equality sign as their outermost symbol,
with ordered pairs in the argument positions. This caused the
accessing of 16 producing the sequent:
VxVyVuVv<xy> = <uv> -<-> (x = u Ay = v) , <ab> = <cd>,Fcd -*■ Fab
However, since by instantiating the variables x, y, u, v, by a, b, c,
d, respectively, and since <ab> = <cd> is true in this sequent it
follows that a - cAb = d is true. Note then that <ab> = <cd> is
equivalent to a = cAb = d. Therefore we delete <ab> = <cd> obtain¬
ing the new sequent:
VxVyVuVv <xy> = <uv> -<-> x=uAy = v, a = cAb = d, Ted Fab
And finally since the reason for accessing 16 no longer applies, and
since it can always be re-accessed if needed again, it is eliminated
from the sequent giving:
a = c A b =d, Ted Fab
Thus, items are accessed by the non-variable symbols they have
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in common with the sentence being proven.
However, this is not quite right, for consider: if when see¬
ing <ab> = <cd> the theorem prover accesses all items with an equality
sign, it would access all of II,...,16 because equality is a very
common symbol. On the other hand if the theorem prover accessed all
items with an ordered pair sign only 16 would be accessed. The
point is that the ordered pair sign occurs less often in the items
than does the equality sign, so that should be the sign it is accessed
by. Thus in general' we can say that items are accessed by the less
common non-variable symbols that they share with the sentence being
proven. For example, a simple LISP implementation would be to store
items on the property list of their least most common non-variable
symbol.
4.2 Organization of Equivalences
We note that all lemmas may be viewed as being equivalences, for
if S is a lemma then 12 ■<-*■ S is an. equivalence.
In section 4.1 we remarked that the sentence <ab> = <cd> was
deleted from the given sequent because a = cAb = d was also in the
sequent and <ab> = <cd> is equivalent to a= c/\b= d. This deletion
is an instance of a powerful principle: If two equivalent sentences
occur in a sequent then delete one of them but re-write the items
which could be accessed by it, so as to be accessed by the other
instead. We call the sentence which was not. deleted the preferred
form of the two. In the case of <ab> = <cd> there were no obvious
items to be re-written, but consider the sequent:
(POS a) , a>o <J>a .
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with the items: x>o -<-> (POS X)
x>o | x | = x
If a>o is to be deleted by the first item then the second item had
better be re-written as:
(POS x) |x| = x
Furthermore, if an item (e.g. 16) causes two equivalent sentences to
occur in a sequent then decide which one is to be deleted and re¬
write the items which could be accessed by it so as to be accessed
by the other instead. Note that any item of the form: A -<-> B or
(A = B) which is accessed by an instance of A where B0 is the pre¬
ferred form will invariably cause the equivalent sentences A© and B©
(F(AG) and F(BG)) to appear in some sequent, followed by the deletion
of AG leaving BG. This is the reason for the unidirectional nature,
that is the replacement of AG by the preferred form BG, of items such
as: II,...,17.
Of course, this unidirectional nature, that is this deletion of
A© is only justified to the extent that all items including initial
logical axioms, which would be accessed by AG in proving the sequent
are now accessible by BG. And research on this problem has, of
course, been done; for example, the theory of definition and the
more recent work of Lankford [16] and for simple algebraic theories
without logical rules. However, the problem is probably too
complex to solve for more difficult theories such as analysis or set-
theory. Our point is that we can structure our theories so that
the AG's need rarely be kept, and that we can implement theorem
provers which can know, in a>practical sense, when such AG's should
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be kept.
Consider for example a theory consisting of the axioms:
Al: (x+y)+ z = x+(y+z)
A2: x+y = y+x
A3: x+y = x+z •*-+ y = z
which are used left to right in a unidirectional manner (A2 being
used only when all variables in the term bound to x alphabetically
precede all variables in the term bound to y). Then a+(b+c) =
b+(a+c) will not be provable because none of the axioms can be
applied. However, noting that A3 should have the effect of cancel¬
ling like variables on opposite sides of the equality sign:
(. . . + x + ... — ...+ x+ ...) -*->■ (...+ ... = ...+ ...)
purely for the purpose of trying to apply A3 in a unidirectional
manner we could allow Al and A2 to be applied in a bi-directional
manner, with the stipulation that when A3 is applied, then all the
superfulous sentences produced would be immediately deleted:
-> a+(b+c) = b+(a+c) :A2
4-
•+ a+(b+c) = (a+c)+b, a+(b+c) = b+(a+c) :A1
-+ a+(b+c) = a+(c+b) , a+(b+c) = (a+c)+b, a+(b+c) = b+(a+c) :A3
+
b+c = c+b :A3
4-
b+c = b+c :A2
4-
m
As a second example consider the use of the logical lemmas:
LI: (Vx, x = tD<j>x) +-> <j)t
L2 : (3x, x = t A<}>x) -«-+ <f>t
in the deductions ..shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
(1) Vx xe{A B} -> cj)x
4-
Vx xe{u: u = A V u = B> -> <f>x
+
Vx ((x = A V x = B) -> (fix)
4-
VxC (x = A -> <px) A (x = B -> 4>x) J
4-
(Vx x = A ->• <}>x) A (Vx x = B -> <}>x)
+








3x xe{u: u = A V u = B} A <j>x
4-
3x((x = A V x = B) A (j)x)
4-
3x (x = A A 4>x) V (x = B A <f>x)
4-









In step three of the first proof the sentence is being put into
conjunctive normal form by an application of a logical distributive
rule, whereas in the third step of the second proof the sentence is
being put into disjunctive normal form. Thus although conjunctive
normal form may be regarded as the preferred, form in which to put
the sentence being proven (for example a sequent calculus essentially
puts the sentence being proven into conjunctive normal form); we see
from the- second proof that in order to apply lemma L2 to some sentence
beginning with an existential quantifier, that the sentence within
the scope of that quantifier should be put into disjunctive normal
form.
A third example is the use of axioms such as:
A1: <j> £ V E&
A2: VxVy {xy} e V <->■ £5
in our set theory program. Although 'El ' is the preferred form, such
axioms are applied in the opposite directions, when the theorem prover
fails to find a proof using its other techniques.
Thus from these examples, we conclude that items are applied in
a unidirectional manner, that is deleting A©, unless there is a
specific reason (e.g. in order to apply another lemma or if no proof
has been found using other techniques) not to do so.
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4.3 Preferred Forms
Given that equivalent sentences should have a preferred form,
the question arises as to which sentence is to be the preferred
form. The answer is simple, that the preferred form should be the
one which minimizes the accessing problems for the items of the
theory.
For example, in our algebra-number theory system the pre¬
ferred form of the equivalences:
El: x+o = x
E2: (3x x = t/\(j)x) ■<-> (fit
2 2
E3: (Vn A*n +B*n+C = D*n +E-n+F) '•<-+ A - D A B = E Ac =
n+1 n





A = D A B = E A C = F
n
(Z k) + n + 1;
k=l
For the first three lemmas it is plausible that the accessing problem
are minimized because (1) the preferred sentence is syntactically les
complex than the other sentence, and (2) because it is not very
difficult to recognize when sentences are in the non-preferred form,
that is to tell when the items should be used. In the case of the
last item, a recursive definition, it is plausible that the accessing
problems are being minimized because it puts E expressions into a
particular form, and again because it is not difficult to recognize
the unpreferred form.
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In our set theory systems for example the preferred form for
lemmas such as II,...,17 and the contextual definition D1 is the
sentence on the right side of each equivalence, for about the same
reasons as in our algebra number theory program. However, the
treatment of definitions such as D2,...,D6 is quite different. For
although on the analogy of recursive definitions we might consider
the definiens to be the preferred form, we also note the immense
difference in syntactic complexity between the definiens and the de-
finiendum. For this- reason theorem provers whose lemmas were re¬
structured so as to apply to the definiens instead of to the
def.iniendum would be very slow. For example, if the non-preferred
sentence lemma 12 were re-structured in terms of definiens we would
have:
[VutVz.zeu zex) -*-> (Vw.weu <-*■ wex)]]
which would be much harder to recognize than the definiendum form
of the sentence
{x} = {y}
Of course, just as in recursive definitions we would not want
the definiendum to be the preferred form because it is very difficult
to recognize when something was the definiens.
For this reason, we believe that the handling of definitions
should be done as was done in our set theory program as follows:
Let the definiens be the preferred form, but try to apply all other
lemmas which work off of that form before replacing any definiendum
by its definiens. For example, when trying to prove the sentence
<ab> = <cd> A Tab Ted
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don't start applying definitions getting
{{a}{ab}} = {{c}{cd}} A Tab -> Ted
but apply all lemmas which work off of ordered pairs first getting:
a = c A b = d /\ Fab ->■ Ted
Thus definitions form a sort of hierarchy. , And only if no proof
is found by using lemmas accessed by means of symbols at that level
should atheorem prover start unravelling definitions trying to obtain
a proof at a lower level.
In summary, we can say that basically the mathematical knowledge
used in deductive reasoning consists of items which may be viewed as
equivalences. That these equivalences.have a preferred form which
gives rise to a unidirectional use, except insofar as there are
specific reasons for avoiding unidirectionality. And, that defined
symbols are replaced by their definiens only when a proof cannot be
found without doing so.
5. Formal Justification of Mathematical Knowledge
Up till now we have discussed the nature of mathematical knowledge
used in deductive reasoning without mentioning.how such, knowledge is
represented. In particular the question arises as to whether such
items must always be represented in our mathematical language, or
whether they might be represented as procedures in the programming
language in which the deductive system was implemented.
At first glance, one might be tempted to argue that of course
items must always be represented in our mathematical language, for if
they were not how could they be proven from the axioms of the theory?
However, this criticism is answered by the fact that such items (i.e.
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procedures) do not need to be proven in order to justify their use
in a proof. Consider for example the use of the procedure PI given
in section 1 in the following inference step:
-+ <j)[a-i- (b+c) = c+(b+a)]
1 by PI
-+ <}>[b+c = c+b]
We do not need to prove the procedure, or rather axiom scheme
PI, but only that instance of the scheme which was actually used in
this inference step, namely:
<f>[b+c = c+b] -> cj)Ca+(b+c) = c+(b+a)]
Note that if <j> is a complex sentence it is probably much easier to
prove <j)[b+c = c+b] and then b+c = c+b -«-+ a+(b+c) = c+(b+a) without
using PI, than to prove <|>[a+(b+c) = c+(b+a) ] without using PI. Thus
it is useful to use PI even if the step must later be justified.
The fact that PI does not need to be justified, can be generalized
to the following £>rinciple: what must be justified is the actual
proof that is produced, not the deductive system which produced the
proof. For example, in the case of people this is quite clear. If
a mathematician proves a theorem, and if we wish to check if he actually
has proven that theorem, we inspect his proof; we do not look inside
his head to see if his brain is consistent! Anyone who disagrees
with this principle will probably also assert that all items should
be represented in the mathematical language. We now give reasons
as to why this restriction would lead to rather inefficient theorem
provers.
Consider again the Procedure PI. There are two ways of viewing
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it as being in our mathematical language. If we view PI as being
a schema of cancelling lemmas such as:
a+ b = a + c •<—> b = c
a + (b + c) = (c + b) + a (b + c) = (c + b)
then each such lemma that the theorem prover might use would have to
be explicitly stored. Besides taking up much storage it will
obviously take much time to find the right scheme to use in any
particular case.
If PI is viewed as being the axioms Al, A2, and A3, given in
Section 1, plus knowledge specifying how to use the axioms so as to
achieve an effect similar to the procedure PI, then every time PI is
used in the entire search space and not just where PI is used in the
final proof that is found, the system will have to go through the
laborious process of simulating PI by applications of axioms Al, A2,
and A3.
In neither case does this compare to the efficiency of PI as
a procedure which simply scans across the equation looking for
occurrences of a variable connected by plus signs to opposite sides
of the equality sign. Note that in comparison to the latter case,
only thoseapplications of PI which actually appeared in the final
proof that is found, would then need to be justified in terms of
axioms Al, A2, and A3. All other applications of PI on all other
branches of the search space do not need to go through this
laborious process of justification because they do not contribute
to the proof.
In summary then we can. say that there are symbolic operations
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(e.g. PI) preformed in mathematics, whose results can be logically
justified, but which themselves cannot reasonably be described in
terms of more primitive operations which can be logically justified.
It is for this reason that items of mathematical knowledge
generally have both a procedural form especially for their uni¬
directional use written in an implementation language such as LISP,
and a mathematical form written in the mathematical language. Of
course if it is not all that necessary that the use of a particular
item be very efficient then the mathematical form may just as well
serve as the procedural form for that item.
5.1 Procedural forms of a lemma
A simple example of these two forms involving a lemma is the
identity axiom of addition. The mathematical form is of course:
x + o = x or rather: (=(+ x (0)) x)
and a procedural form could be the LISP function
(LAMBDA (X) (OR (AND (EQ (CAR X) (QUOTE +))
(EQ (CAADDR X)(QUOTE 0) )
(CADR X))X))
or even that function compiled into machine code. In the following
inference step note that (J> (a) should be obtained from <f> (a + o) by use
of the procedural form, not the mathematical form, for this is more
efficient.
<j> (a + c)
LO 1 LO*: x + 0 = x
♦ (a)
Note however that the justification given for this inference step
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is the mathematical form x + o = x.
5_. 2 Procedural form of a schema
Items which are not lemmas are not represented in our formal
mathematical language, and thus have only a procedural form. For
this reason such items.are called procedures. For example, a
procedural form for PI written in LISP rather than in English is
given in Figure 4. Furthermore, because procedures are not rep¬
resented, we will take as the justification for using them in an
inference step, any particular group of lemmas which could have been
used to obtain that inference. For example, from our remarks in
section 1 we see that a group of axioms which could be used to
justify the procedure PI is {Al, A2, A3}. This leads to two
different kinds of proof steps: the compressed and the uncompressed.
A compressed proof step using the procedure PI is for example:
a + (b c) = c + (b + a)
PI 4- {A1,A2,A3 once}
a + b = b + a
where each lemma in the group may need to be used zero or more times
except where specified (e.g. A3) in justifying that:
a + b = b + a implies a + (b + c) = c + (b + a).
Of course, in the traditional formal sense of 'proof', proofs
are restricted to involving proof steps which are justified by use
of a single application of one lemma. For this reason there is
also the uncompressed form of a proof step involving a procedure.
This form is obtained by filling in explicit proof steps, each
involving a single lemma from the group of lemmas. For example, an
84
Figure 4
{DEFPROP PI (LAMBDA(X) (PROG(XI X2 Y U)
(SETQ Y (PCANCEL (CDR X)))
other items)
N4 (RETURN(COND( (EQ Y(CDR X))X) (T(CONS (QUOTE EQUAL)Y))
)) EXPR)
(DEFPROP CYL T SPECIAL)
(DEFPROP PCANCEL (LAMBDA(X) (PROG(XI CYL X2 U)
(SETQ U(CAR X))
PI (COND '({NOT (EQ U (SETQ XI (LOGEVAL U) ) )) (SETQ U XI) (GO PI) ) )
(SETQ U(CADR X))
P2 (COND((NOT (EQ U(SETQ CYL(LOGEVAL U)))) (SETQ U CYL) (GO P2)))
(SETQ X2(PCI XI))
(COND((AND(EQ XI(CAR X))(EQ CYL(CADR X))) (RETURN X)) )
(RETURN(LIST X2 CYL))
)) EXPR)
(DEFPROP PCI (LAMBDA(X) (PROG(U)
(COND ( (OR (ATOM X) (NOT (EQ (CAR X) (QUOTE PLUS) ) ) )
(RETURN(COND ( (NOT(EQ CYL(SETQ U(PC2 X CYL))))
(SETQ CYL U)(QUOTE (ZERO)))
(T X) ) ) )
((NOT(EQ CYL(SETQ U(PC2(CADR X)CYL))))
(SETQ CYL U) (RETURN(PCI(CADDR X)))) )
(SETQ U(PC1 (CADDR X)))
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(RETURN(COND((EQ U(CADDR X)) X)
((EQ(CAR U)(QUOTE ZERO)) (CADR X))
(T (LIST(QUOTE PLUS)(CADR X)U)) ))
)) EXPR)
(DEFPROP PC2 (LAMBDA(XY) (PROG(U)
(COND((OR(ATOM Y)(NOT(EQ(CAR Y)(QUOTE PLUS))))
(RETURN(COND((EQUAL X Y)(QUOTE (ZERO)))
(T Y) )))
((EQUAL X(CADR Y)) (RETURN(CADDR Y))) )
(SETQ U (PC2 X(CADDR Y)))
(RETURN(COND((EQ U(CADDR Y)) Y)
((EQ(CAR U)(QUOTE ZERO)) (CADR Y))
(T (LIST(QUOTE PLUS)(CADR Y)U)) ))
)) EXPR
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uncompressed form of the above proof step is:
a + (b + c) = c + (b + a)
/ '
z •+ A1 *\
/ '
^ a + (b + c) = (c + b) + a
P11^ 4- A2 r~ filling m
\ a + (b + c) = a + (c + b) I
^
\ + A3 J
~~~~ '
-■)> b + c = c + b
Note that b + c = c +• b is produced by PI before filling in even
occurs. This filling in of the compressed form producing the un¬
compressed form may be done by either deducing b + c = c + b from
at (b + c) = c + (b + a) by using only the lemmas in the group,
namely Al, A2, and A3, or by having an explicit prestored function
for each procedure which fills in the missing steps.
Although, as we have explained, it is only the uncompressed
form of proof steps which appear in traditional formal proofs, it is
noted that the compressed forms are used quite often in mathematical
texts, and have important implications for the abbreviation of proofs.
5.3 Theory of Expressions
Finally, any discussion of the nature of justification would not
be complete without mentioning the idea of representing procedures
(e.g. PI) in a mathematical language by use of a theory of expressions
such as pure LISP. In such a case the group of axioms (e.g. {Al, A2,
A3}) which are the justification of an inference step using the pro¬
cedural form of PI, would be replaced by this mathematical represent¬
ation of PI. For example, the procedure PI could have the mathematical
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form: (I have given i;n [29] a correct definition of the meaning
function.)
PI* (meaning (list '■<-*
(list '=
(cons '+ (Append xl (cons z yl)))
(cons ' + (Append x2 (cons z y2))) )
(list '=
(cons '+ (Append si yl))
(cons 1+ (Append x2 y2)) )
))
Schema.tically PI* is something like:
[(+ ... z ...) = (+ ... z ...)] •<—>■ [+ ) = (+ ... ...)]
xl yl x2 y2 xl yl x2 y2
where the plus sign of arbitrary arity is defined in terms of a binary
plus and zero:
(+X . . . X ) = (+ X (+ X . . . (+ X X ) ...))
1 n 12 n-1 n
(+) = o
Then by use of induction over expressions PI* could be proven
to be a meta theorem of any theory containing axioms Al, A2, and A3.
Note that PI* is related to PI in the same sense as LO* (i.e.
1x + o = x') is related to its procedural form LO. Namely that
while PI* and LO* (x + o = x) are sentences and have mathematical
meaning, Pi and LO do not.
As much as we like this idea, we point out that justifications
using a theory of expressions do not seem to appear in mathematics
as much as do the earlier 'group of lemmas' method. For example, if
you asked someone why the following inference step was correct in
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arithmetic:
(a + b) + c = c + (b + a)
i
b + c = c + b
he would probably answer: because of the associativity Al,
commutativity A2, and cancellation laws A3. It is doubtful if the
answer would be: because of PI*.
In summary let us note that we are not claiming that all
mathematical results obtained by a deductive system are entirely
justified in terms of the primitive axioms of that theory, but rather,
that they are only potentially justifiable in the following sense:
if the validity of any inference step in a proof is questioned, then
the deductive system, will be able to describe how that step was pro¬
duced (i.e. why - the items justifying that step are valid) in terms
of more primitive items.
6. Mathematical Reasoning Systems
Having now described what an extensible mathematical theory
consists of, namely an extensible deductive system; we are left with
the question as to how such systems can be automatically produced?
In particular, assuming the extensible deductive system has available
for its use a certain number of items, initially only the primitive
axioms, how can further items be automatically created and added to
the deductive system. How can such items be organized and how can
their procedural forms be produced?
We will call any such system which can construct mathematical
theories, a mathematical reasoning system. As a first approximation,
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we suggest that a mathematical reasoning system consists of a number
of highly interacting components, the first of which is an extensible
deductive system which has already been described. The other com¬
ponents would be as follows:
(1) An inductive reasoning system which can create new
sentences of our mathematical language, and propose
that they are theorems.
(2) A notation introduction system, which can introduce
new mathematical symbols (for example defined symbols)
into our mathematical language, so as to facilitate the
deductive processes by minimizing the accessing problems.
(3) A preference analysis system which can choose the pre¬
ferred form for any given set of equivalent sentences.
(4) A procedural coding system which can compile an axiom,
or group of axioms, into their procedural forms.
(5) A debugging system which can relate failures to obtain
justifications to possible errors in the procedural code.
As an example of how these components might interact, consider
the problem of automatically constructing the theorem prover T7 from
the theorem prover T6 in the extensible set theory system described
in section 3. These interactions which are described below are
displayed in Figure 5. Note however, that there are many more
necessary interactions, than those here displayed or described.
First the inductive reasoning system must create the sentence 17
and propose that it is a theorem. Next the deductive system would
then try to prove 17 by using T6. If successful then the preference
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analysis system would decide that l'xy was the preferred form of the
two equivalent sub-sentences in 17. The procedural coding system
would then construct a procedural form for 17 which would replace
sentences of the unpreferred form:
<xy> e{<uv>:. Tuv}
by corresponding sentences of the preferred form:
Fxy
This procedural form would then be organized with, other procedural
forms in the deductive system resulting in the theorem prover T7.
When needed for proving further theorems, this lemma would be
accessed from its less common constant symbols; for example, the
relation symbol: : ...}. Now suppose that the defin¬
ition D5 of this symbol had not yet been made and that the lemma
17 were instead:
<xy> e {z: 3u3v z = <uv> A Tuv} -<->■ Fxy
It would then be more difficult to access this lemma because the
symbols occurring in it are quite common, and occur more often in
set theory than does the relation symbol. Thus, in order to
minimize the accessing problems it would be the job of the notation
introduction system to immediately define the relation symbol.
Then using this defined symbol the inductive reasoning system
would be able to create the earlier version of 17.
Finally, suppose that the theorem prover T6 were able to prove
some theorem but that the theorem prover T7, using the lemma 17 were
not. Then, assuming that nothing was wrong with T6, it would be
reasonable to think that there was a bug in the procedural form of
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17. It would then be the job of the debugging system to isolate
this bug and to correct the procedural form.
Some further work on the nature of inductive reasoning is given
noi
J_ii L U J
7. Conclusions
We have argued that modern Deductive Knowledge systems are not
in themselves the kind of theorem provers that are needed in order to
develop general mathematical reasoning systems, and that what is
needed are extensible'Deductive Knowledge systems. Furthermore, we
have discussed how an extensible deductive knowledge system would
interact with a general mathematical reasoning system.
In the next chapter we describe a prototype extensible deductive
system for elementary set theory, that we have implemented.
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V Towards the Automation of Set Theory and Its Logic
1. Introduction
This is a report of some of our .research carried out mainly
(3.u.jTinqj t*iG siAinniszr sncl fsll of 197'1» It dsscirii^GS cin irn.plsniGrit3.tion
of a prototype extensible deductive system for the domain of element¬
ary set theory.
Our goal in performing this research was to construct a theorem
prover which was extensible, in the sense that new mathematical facts
could be added and used by the system, while still allowing proofs
involving those facts to be formally justified in terms of the
original, axioms of the theory. Our motivation for wanting to con¬
struct extensible systems is that we believe that such a system as
opposed to an ordinary theorem prover is ah essential component of
a system which could construct mathematical theories.
In sections 2 and 3 we describe and then exemplify our basic
deductive system. In section 4 we describe an application of an
extensible version of this system, to the proving of a number of
theorems in W.V.O. Quine's book: Set Theory and its Logic C13.
The implementation of our system is described in section 5, and some
conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2, Description of the Theorem Prover
Our theorem prover consists of an interpreter for mathematical
expressions and many items of mathematical knowledge. This interp¬
reter is a fairly complex mechanism, but it may be viewed as applying
items of mathematical knowledge of the form: <J> -*-*■ iJj or <J> = to the
theorem being proven, in the following manner. The interpreter
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evaluates the theorem recursively in a call-by-need manner. That
is, if (fa^...a^) is a sub-expression being evaluated, then the
interpreter tries to apply its items of knowledge to that sub¬
expression before evaluating the arguments a ...a . For each sub-
1 n
expression that the interpreter evaluates, in turn it tries to match
the <j> expression of an item to that sub-expression. . If, however,
during the application process an argument does not match the
corresponding argument of the (J) expression, then a^ is evaluated,
and the system then tries to match the result of that evaluation.
If ever the interpreter finds a sub-expression <}>0 which is an in¬
stance of (j> of some item, then it replaces that expression by the
corresponding instance ip6 of \jj. At this point all memory of the
sub-expression <J>0 is immediately lost and 'the interpreter now
evaluates ipB. If no items can be applied to a sub-expression then
the sub-expression is not evaluated again but is simply returned.
For example, if {x} = {y} x = y and {x} = -fx} §g are the
only items and if they are listed to be used in that order then
evaluating the theorem {a} = {a} V A / A will cause the sub¬
expression {a} = {a} to be replaced by A = A resulting in
A = A V A ^ A. All memory of the sub-expression {a} = {A} is
immediately lost upon its replacement by A = A and thus the in¬
terpreter does not attempt to apply the second item to {a} = {a}.
This interpreter has been used to prove theorems in several
mathematical domains [2]. The items used by the interpreter in a
particular domain are intended to be theorems of that domain. Thus
for example, if T is a conjunction of axioms for a particular domain,
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and if (J) ■<-* \p is an item used in that domain, then F (<f> <-*■ \p)
should be logically valid.
Sometimes it will be the case that our interpreter will need
to use items which are only valid in certain sub-domains of a given
domain. For example, in set theory, if we wish to prove theorems
about functions (note that a function is a particular type of set)
it would be quite useful to have available items which are only valid
in the domain of functions, or more precisely when certain of the free
variables occurring in the item are restricted to being functions:
The representation of the item would be :
Func f->- ip^)
More generally. then, if we wish to use an item <j>x ^x (or <j>x = ipx)
where x is restricted to the sub-domain Tlx', then we represent it by a
conditional item:
IIx -*■ (<f)x -<-* ipx) (or Tlx -> c[)x = ipx)
Note that (F A IIx) -> (cJjx ■«-> ipx) should be logically valid.
The interpreter handles conditional items in the same way in which
it handles non-conditional items until it has found a cf>0 which matches
the sub-expression being evaluated. At this point on a conditional
item, the interpreter tries to match each element in the conjunction
Tlx with some expression which it believes to be true. If such
matches are found with substitution 0a then ip6a is returned. Other¬
wise the interpreter tries to apply another item as previously described.
The use of conditional items provides a general method of restrict¬
ing the free variables of an item to a particular sub-domain. Its
only disadvantage is that the amount of extra matching it forces the
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interpreter to perform. In order to minimize the amount of matching
on the most common sub-domains we allow those sub-domains to be
indicated by a particular style of variables.
For example, the automatic theorem prover described in this
paper which is based on the set theory system described in Quine's:
Set Theory and its Logic til involves two domains. . The larger domain,
is the domain of abstracts, where an abstract of any propositional
functional fx with one free variable x is simply: {x: fx}, and the
smaller domain is the' domain of sets where a set is nothing more than
an abstract a which exists; that is where 3x x = a is a theorem of
Quine's system.
Roman letters are used to indicate the sub-domain of sets whereas
Greek letters are used to represent both s'ets and other abstracts.
Thus, for example, an item of the form
<J)X -*-> t|;x
is logically equivalent to one of the form:
qeV (<f)0t •<->■ i/>oO
where V is the universal abstract, that is the abstract which contains
every set.
Just as a point about our notation, the reader will note that
both Roman and Greek letters are also used to represent propositions.
However, since the domain of propositions is distinct from the domain
of abstracts, in most cases, there should be no difficulty in determ¬
ining what is intended. For example, in a A y(a and y) both ct and
y represent propositions whereas ia.cc/^y (a intersection v) a repre¬
sents an abstract and y represents a set. Furthermore, even in
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cases where disambiguation is not jjossible such as 1 <J>a' (note that
a represents either an abstract or a proposition depending on
whether <j> represents a predicate or logical connective) it does
not real.lv matter as Morse [3] has shown that we can let the two
domains be identical.
An informed reader will recall that tables of rewrite rules
(rather simple items represented in ones mathematical language),
and other items were used in many of Bledsoe's theorem provers
[4,5], and that Boyer' and Moore [6,7] used a symbolic LISP interpreter
to order the application of various recursive definitions, rewrite
rules, and induction rules. More recently Aubin [8] has also used
a symbolic interpreter for much the same purpose.
This theorem prover includes both logical and set-theoretic
knowledge. We first describe the items of logical knowledge, and
then the items of set theoretic knowledge.
2.1 Logical Knowledge
Our theorem prover has knowledge about twelve logical symbols












-> implies (This symbol is called a sequent arrow)
and and (This symbol is used to form an implicit con¬
junction of sequents)
The sequent arrow may be defined as follows:
<j>l.. . <f>n ->■ if)l. . .ifin (cf>l /\. . . A<f>n) 3 (if)l V.. .V if) )
where <j)i. and'if)j are sentences. Thus a sequent may be thought of as
being a database of statements <j>l, . .., if>n called assertions which
occur before the sequent arrow, and statements if)l, . .., ifm called
goals which occur after the sequent arrow. The implicit conjunction
of different sequents may be thought of as being a group of different
databases.
The items of logical knowledge, which are all schemata because
they involve ellipses (i.e. dots representing arbitrary expressions),
are listed below:
Assertion schemata:
.) (. . ..->..)
. .->-x..)
x ,y. .)
x..->..) and (. .y )
. .-*-x..) and (..y..->. .)
x,y. .-»-..) and (.. ..->x,y..)
m ; (. . S3 .
n (.. « .
'b (. .^x .
A ->; (. .x A y.
V (. .x "V y.
3 - y: (. .x 3 y.
<-■*■ -*■: (. . x-<->y . ,-v
3 (.. 3x (fx. .->■ <f>(/* . . .* )..->..)In
where ■£ is a new skolem function and *,...* are all the
In
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unification variables which occur in <}>x.
p* . . .* ) = t }
= ■+: (na..^t= ^ j<*..ra-><pa..ipa) <->- (lit. .rt->-<j>t. .i(Jt)
where f is a skolem function not occurring in t and a is
This is our version of the law of Leibnitz, for example:
(a = b i/c + c Sa) -h- .( c S'b V c)
Goal schemata:
-y® : (• • ~y •. • • ) ++ 13
-y c : ( B\ • • ' • • •• )
-* v : (. X )
■y /\ : (. .x A y- • )
->v : (. .-y. .x V y.. ) -y-y . .x,y. .)
■> 3 : (. .x 3 y.. ) <-y .. x->.. y..)
-v <->: x<->y . . ) y-y . .jc>. .y..) and (..y*..x..)
■y V : (. .-y.. Vx <J>x.. ) <j> (/* ... * ) ..)
1 n
where f is a new skolem function and * .
n
the unification variables which occur in <j)x.
Other logical schemata:
atom: (. . x. .x. .) -e-> (5!5
and : (. . and gg and ..) <-»• (. . and . .)
Logical schemata used only at certain times:
Unify: [(. .x, .y, ..) and .. and .. (..x .y ..)3 -<->
11 n n
[ (. .x. . .y. . .) and .. and .. (..x . .y
11 n n
where l^i^n and 0 is any one of the substitutions which satisfy both
the forcing restriction and the instantiation restriction. These
two restrictions are described below.
'V
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The forcing restriction is the requirement that the substitution 0
makes tautologous the greatest number of sequents starting with the
first sequent and progressing towards the nth sequent. The rational
behind this restriction, is similar to Bledsoe's [4,5] ideas on
forcing, in that we force each sequent to make its contribution to 0
and then throw it away. In the case that there actually is some
substitution which will make all the sequents tautologous, without
further unification variables being created (by the V -> and -* ] items
which will be described later in this section) this restriction leads
to a complete proof procedure, in that 0 will be one such substitution.
As a minor point, if 0 makes all the sequents tautologous, then this
item is defined to return E . An example instance of this item
illustrating the forcing restriction is:
[ (P* Pa,Pb) and (Q* ->- Qb) and (R* Ra) ] -<->■ (Rb Ra)
The unification variable * was instantiated to b not to a, because
the substitution [* = b] makes tautologous the first two sequents,
whereas the substitution [* = a] makes only the first sequent
tautologous.
In this example, if the sequent (R* -»■ Ra) had occurred before
the sequent (Q* ->■ Qb) then in fact * would have to be instantiated
to a and the sequent (Qa -> Qb) would have been the result. Thus we
see that in the incomplete case where there is not a substitution 0
which makes all the sequents tautologous, that the order of the
sequents in the list of sequents to which the unify item is applied,
can materially effect the results of applying the unify item. We
call any strategy which chooses the ordering of the sequents to which
lOl
the unify item is applied, a forcing strategy, and will later discuss
our forcing strategy.
instantiation restriction is the requirement that no unific¬
ation variable be instantiated to a term which already occurs in the
list associated with the quantifier from which that, unification
variable was produced by an application of either the V -> item or the
-»• 3 item. The rational behind this restriction is that if a term t
is already in the list associated with a quantifier such as V in
(. . Vxtjjx. .) then every sub-formulae of <j>t must occur in some
sequent which must be made tautologous.* Thus for any sequent
containing a sub-formulae \p* of cj>*, if t already occurs in the list
associated with (Vx(j>x) , then one of the following must hold:
(1) ipt is already in that sequent
(2) Some sub-formulae of ipt is already in that sequent and
applying further logical items to ijjt will eventually
result in a sequent containing a second occurrence of
that sub-formulae.
(3) ijit is a sub-formulae of some formulae already in that
sequent, and applying further logical items to that
formulae will eventually result in a sequent containing
a second occurrence of ipt.
It follows that instantiating * to t, could only be redundant.
* Strictly speaking this remark must be modified so as to account
for the = ->- item and any non logical items. It does, however,
convey the basic idea.
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The list of terras associated with a quantified formulae such as
(Vxc|>x) essentially represent the instances <j>t^ .. . <{>t of it that
have been produced. This list is stored by appending it onto the
end of a list containing the bound variable x as in: (V (xt, .. t )
In
<j>x) . An example of the use of this restriction is the following
instance of the Unify schemata:
(Qt •+ (3 (x t *) (Px)) , (Q*) ) <-> (Qt -> (3 (x t *) (Px) ) , (Q*) )
note that * cannot be instantiated to t because t already occurs in
the list of the quantifier containing the unification variable *.
We know that Q* is a sub-formulae of P* because the * in Q* occurs in
the list of the quantifier binding Px.
A substitution list 0 is applied to a sequent as follows:
successively, for each substitution [* - (t *,... * )], everyIn
occurrence of * which occurs inside a skolem function is replaced by
the segment ... * , and every other occurrence of * is replaced by
the term (t* ... * ). Thus for example if the sequent is:
In
-»■ * = (•/*) {*}
where./ is a skolem function, then applying the substitution
[* = (* *2^ Produces the new sequent:
-> * * = (/* * ) kj {* r\ * >
1 t 2 k. 1 2> ^ i 2
If the substitution is (* := A) then the new sequent is:
-> A = (•/■ {J A)
where / becomes a skolem constant.
The reason we are able to replace a variable * in a term (/*)
where f is a skolem function, by the sequence * ... * rather than
In
by the terra (t * ... * ) is because every term beginning with /
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must be identical. Thus if * is replaced by (t * ... * ) .-in (/*) ,
every term beginning with i must then be identical to (/(t ... * )).
But since every term beginning with f is followed by (t ... * ) and
since */ is merely a skolem function (/ (t * ... * )) is logically
equivalent to (g *, ... * ) where g is a new skolem function. Re-1 n
placing all occurrences of (f(t * ... * )) by (g * ... * ) we see
1 n 1 n
that rf- no longer occurs in any expression. For this reason we can
then rename g as -f obtaining (/ ... *^) .
/Vxtj>x Nj (\^(x*)^x
v ^ tV(x. . . *) (fix j ' •5
where * is a new unification variable and no more than one
unification variable occurs in (x...).
■>3 : (.
'lx§x (3 (x*) <j>x
where * is a new unification variable and no more than one
unification variable occurs in (x...).
In the last two items we have seen formulae of the form
V(x...)<|>x and 3 (x...)<j)x which are not usually thought of as being
well formed sentences of logic. Such formulas should be interpreted
as respectively Vx<j>x and 3xcJ>x which are well found sentences of logic.
The ... list is used merely to store certain pragmatic information
used by the deductive system. This information is simply the list
of instantiations of the unification variables that were produced
from this quantifier by applications of the V ■+ or + 3 item. This
pragmatic information is kept in order to be able to check the in¬
stantiation restriction, when using the Unify item, and in order to
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check the restriction on the V -> and -> 3 items that no more than one
unification variable may already occur in the (x ...) list. This
last requirement is called the variable restriction. The rational
behind this restriction is that there is no way in which three
instances ^*3 °£ a formulae <f>x could interact so as to bind
at least one of thoseunification variables, that could not be obtained
by initially using only two instances and then after one of the unific¬
ation variables is bound, and if necessary creating a third instance.
An example of the use" of this restriction is the fact that the 3
item could not be applied to the sequent:
(-> (3 (x*1 *2) 4> ))
The logical items are not all used at the same time. In par¬
ticular the V 3 , and unify items are used in a special way.
Initially, the interpreter evaluates each sequent trying to apply the
items in the following order:
f(1) Non splitting assertion items:
(3 n ^ /\ 3 = ->
(2) Non splitting goal items:
-*•£3 t ~y n 1 "*■ ^, ■►V/ -O, -+V




(4) The atom and "and" items
' (5) Splitting assertion items:
' V '^> +r ">
!
\\
(6) Split ting goal items:
V
-»-A , ->• «-*■
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(B) The Unify item
(C) The V -> and -> 3 items once.
The group (A) of items are applied first and are used in what
is the normal evaluation process in a call-by-need manner. The
sub-ordering from (1) to (6) do not really reflect how the system is
implemented, but merely the fact that we try to delay splitting as
long as possible, and within that restriction, try to work on
assertions in a sequent, before working on goals. A reason for
preferring to work on' assertions first is that applications of the
= item can often simplify the problem a great deal. A simple
reason for delaying splitting and applying the other items first is
so that we don't have to apply those items twice after the split to
each sequent separately. For example, if we split on (A -> B A C)
obtaining (A -* B) and (A -> C) we then have two copies of A to which
to apply our items. However, we find that the time gained by not
having to apply items a second time to A, seems to be balanced by
the time lost necessary to effect the delaying operation. A more
substantial reason for delaying the splitting items is to handle
certain subtle interactions between the V, 3 3 and V -»• items
necessitated by the incompleteness caused by the forcing restriction.
These interactions will be described later in section 3 when we
discuss our proof of Cantor's theorem.
After the items of group (A) have been applied as many times
as possible, the interpreter then tries to apply the unify item to
the particular re-ordering of the conjunction of sequents, that is
determined by the forcing strategy. The forcing strategy we have
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used is this: The conjunction of sequonts are re-ordered such that
those sequents which contain formulas beginning with a quantifier
such that the quantifier
(1) satisfies the variable restriction
and
(2) has the shortest associated list of instantiations of
any sequent in the conjunction
are at the end, and hence will be unified last. The rational
behind our forcing strategy is that each quantifier should get its
fair chance to contribute instances towards proving the theorem.
Thus, for example, if we forced out a sequent (by unifying it first)
containing a quantifier which had not contributed any instances yet,
and if that quantifier was actually needed in order to prove the
theorem, then it is very probable that the substitutions made in
unifying that sequent are irrelevant and,in fact, detrimental to
solving the other sequents in the conjunction of sequents. It
would be detrimental because now that unification variable would al¬
ready be bound to the wrong thing and could no longer be bound to
what it should be bound to in order to solve the other sequents.
Note then that if we do re-order according to our forcing strategy
then the sequent containing that quantifier will probably not be
made tautologous immediately, but later that quantifier will get its
fair chance to contribute instances towards proving theorem. Note
that the first application of the unify item will only result in
that same conjunction of sequents because there would be no unification
variables in the sequents until after an item in step (C) had been
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applied at least once. An example of -the effect of our forcing
strategy is to re-order:
[(Qa -> 3 (x *1 C) Q*x) and (Qb 3 (x *1) Q*^ ]
as:
[(Qb -> 3 (x *1 C) .Q* ) and (Qa 3 (x * ) Q*1) ]
thus forcing * to be bound to b and not to a by the unify item.
(C) Next, if the application of the unification item does not result
in El, then the interpreter picks a sequent from the conjunction of
sequents and tries to' apply the V ->• and -> 3 items once to each formula
in the sequent which begins with a quantifier such that, the quantifier
has the fewest number of terms in its associated list of any quantifier
which satisfies the variable restriction in that sequent. We call this
strategy for creating unification variables the creation strategy.
Note that a quantifier followed by only a variable, not a list, counts
as having zero terms. Thus, for example, the creation strategy
implies that only the V ->- item would be applied to the sequent:
((Vx Px) -> (3 (xa) Qx) , (3 (y*) Qy))
The rational behind the creation strategy is that for each
sequent it simply implements a breath first method of creating
unification variables from the quantifiers in that sequent. This
strategy initially causes one unification variable to be created in
that sequent. Note, however, that if the theorem cannot be proven
with a single unification variable for each quantifier, then it does
not fail but continues to create more variables as called for by the
creation strategy. This allows us, for example, to prove theorems
which need multiple variables from their quantifiers such as
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examples 4 and 6 given in section 3.
Finally, if the application of the unification item of step
(B) resulted in fS then the processes terminates because the theorem
has been proven.
The fact that only assertion equations are ever eliminated by
= -> schema implies a preference, for sequents containing only
equations, not to have more than one goal equation. The reason for
this preference is that there is no logical item which allows two
goal equations to interact to produce (§ . • Thus one of the goals
would probably be irrelevant.
The application of every assertion or goal procedure to a data¬
base involves a particular logical symbol other than 'and' or .
For this reason we may view such procedures as being instructions of
a language which manipulates databases. For example, the execution
of the goal instruction ->■ A on A A B creates two new databases
(worlds, contexts) as follows:
(1) First A A B is erased from the current database.
(2) A copy of the database is then created. (Actually in
our system all this structure is shared).
(3) B is added as a new goal to the copy.
(4) A is added as a new goal to the current database.
A summary of the effect of goal and assertion instructions is given
in Table 1. Note that the interpreter has complete freedom of
choice both as to what database to work on first, and as to what
instruction to execute first.
An informed reader will recall that these propositional rules
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Table 1:' A Summary of logical instructions
Instructions* effect as an assertion effect as a goal
!£S no-op**** succeed
n succeed*** no-op
^ A add A as a goal assert A
A A- B assert A and B split /add A as a goal
(.add B as a goal
A V B split** ^assert A
\assert B
add A and B as goals
A D B split /add A as a goal assert A, add B as a' 1
(assert B goal
A B split iadd A and B as goals split /assert A, add B
(assert A and B (las a goal
. /assert B, add A
w
(as a goal
Vxcfix assert (J>* where * is a new add goal <j>(^* . ..*n>





which occur in <f>x.
3x(j>x assert )whereIn add goal <}>* where * is
f is a new skolern function a new unification
!■
and *,...* are all the1 n variable.
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unification variables









of the skolem term
1
•• • (£* •..* ) by t.
1 n
where •f does not
occur in t
* With the exception of the V assertion instruction and the ]
goal instruction, and executed instruction is always erased.
** Split means that a new data base is created.
*** Succeed means that the data base itself is erased.
**** A null operation.
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are used in Wang's algorithm in the LISP 1.5 manual [9], and that
Wang [10] used the other rules restricted to the decidable case of
where only skolem constants, but not skolem functions, were necessary.
The general idea of unification is due to Prawitz [11] who used rules
similar to all the rules given here except for = -»■ and unify. His
unification rule leads to a complete logic, ours does not.
Robinson [12] clarified Prawitz's unification algorithm by re-defin-
ing it, as we have done, in terms of skolem functions, rather than in
terms of ordering restrictions on Unification variables and skolem
constants. Bibel and Schreiber [13] have implemented a complete
sequent logic, which disregarding certain inessential syntactic
variations, is similar to our system except for the fact that it is
complete and, always finds simplest proofs by a clever algorithm
which, has the effect of always applying splitting rules before
applying unification variable producing rules (i.e. i and V ->) .
For example, given the sequent
3xAx /\ Bx, 3xCx
their algorithm in effect simultaneously checks for the following
three sequences of applying rules.
(1) -> A* /\ B* , 3 xCx
-> A* , 3xCx; B*^ 3xCx
a* C* - r* o*A
1' 2 ' B 1C 3
(2) -»• A* A B* , 3xCx
A*x A B*x, C*2
-> A*1# C*2; _B*1, C*2
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(3) a- tlxAx A Bx, c*^
-> A*2 A B*2 C*
-> A*2, C* ; -* B*2, C*
2.2 Set theoretic knowledge
Our theorem prover has knowledge about 6ne primitive set theoretic
symbol: e which is interpreted as: is an element of, and knowledge
about a large number of defined symbols. Some of these defined
symbols along with their definitions and English translations are
listed in Table 2. In that table, the name of each ex¬
pression usually indicates where that expression may be found in
Quine's book: Set Theory and its Logic [1]. For example, the
definition of the symbol <C whose name is Q2P3 is expression number
3 in chapter 2 of that book. Note that a definition essentially
defines the expression on the left side of the outermost or =
sign in terms of the expression on the right side.
There are four kinds of items definitions,reduction lemmas,existence
axioms, and existence lemmas. As previously mentioned, most of the
definitions that were used are listed in Table 2. The reduction
lemmas that were used are listed in Table 3. The existence axioms
are given in Table 4, and the existence lemmas, are given in Table 5.
Definitions and Reduction lemmas are of the forms <f> -*-> \p f $ — tp,
II -> (<j> ifi) ,or 11 -> (<j> ~ ip) . Existence axioms and existence lemmas
are of the form: <j> e V where V is the universal abstract.
The definitions and reduction lemmas are used only as items by
the interpreter to evaluate sub-expressions, as described at the be¬




Q2P1 : Vy ye{x: rx}-e->-ry
Q2P2 : a £ B^Vx xea-*xeg
Q2P3 : a c g-e-Ax BA ^B £ a
Q2P4 : a t7g={x:xea Vxeg}
Q2P5 : ar\g={x:xeaAxeg}
Q2P6 : a={x:^xea} ,
Q2P7 : a=g-e^Vx xea-<-a-xeg
Q2P8 : 0={z: n }
Q2P9 : V={ z : (| }
Q5P5 : {x:Fx}eg^->3y y={x:Tx}A yeB
Q7P1A : {a}={z: z=a}
Q7P1B : {ag}={z: z=aVz=g}
Q8P1 : Ua={x: 3y xeyAyea}
Q8P9 : /~)a={x: Vy yea->xey}
Q8P18 : ■7 xrx= {y: Vx Tx-<->x=y}
Q9P1 • : <ag>={{a}{ag}}
Q9P4 : {<xy>: F xy}={u:3x3y u=<xy>/\Fxy}
Q9P6 : °a={<xy>:<xy> ea}
Q9P11 : axB=(<xy>:xea A ye g}
Q9P12 : a={<xy>:<yx>ea}
Q9P13 : a|g={<xz>:3y<xy>eaA<yz>eg}
Q9P14 : a"g={x: 3y<xy>ea Ayeg}
Q9P15 : I={<xy>: x=y}
Q10P1 : Func a-<-> (VxVyVz<xz>ea A<yz>ea->x=y)A a=
English Translation
the abstract of










the set {x:Fx} is in
unit set
pair set
union of all subsets
intersection of all
subsets











a is a function
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Q10P2 : arg a={x:3ya"{x}={y}} the arguments of
Q10P11: a'3= 9y<yg>ea apply
Q10P21: Ax(ax)={<yx>:y=(ax)} the function
D1 Pa={u: u£"a} powerset
Q11P1 : Func^A a£V 3 The cardinality of
a is less than or
equal to the card¬
inality of 3
Q20P3 : a<3^-^3^oi The cardinality of
a is less than the
cardinality of 3
Table 3; Reduction Lemmas
Q6P4 : a=a •<-»- IS?
Q7P7 : VxVy{x} = {y} x=y
Q7P8A : Vx Vy Vz {xy} = {z} x=z A y=z
Q7P8B : Vx Vy Vz {z} = {xy} -<-> z=x A z=y
Q7P9: : Vx Vy Vu Vv {xy} = {uv} ■<-*■ (x=u A y=v) V (x=v A y=u)
Q9P3 : Vx Vy <xy> = <uv> ■<-* x=u A y=v
Q9P5 : Vx Vy <xy> e {<uv> : (fuv} cj>xy
Q10P24: Vt Vy Xx(ij)x) ' y = <f>y
CRL1 : Func i -> (<wy>ef w=/'y)
Table 4: Existence axioms and axiom of extentionality
Q7P10A: 0eV
Q7P10B: Vx Vy {xy} eV
Q4P1 : Vx Vy Vz (x=y A xez. 25 yez)
Table 5: Existence Lemmas
Q7P12: {a}eV
Q7P13: {ag}eV
El : n xFxeV
E2 : <a$>£V
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For any given sub-expression that ,.is being evaluated the in¬
terpreter tries to apply the definitions and reduction lemmas in
the following order:
first: Q2P1
then : All reduction lemmas in reverse order from that listed
in Table 3.
and finally: All other definitions.
For example, since the definition Q9P1 is tried only after the
the reduction lemma Q9P3, <xy> = <uv> evaluates to x = u A y = v
using Q9P3 and not to
({x} = {u} A {x y} = {uv}) V ({x} = {uv} A {xy} = {u})
using Q7P9 via definition Q9P1.
The philosophy behind restricting definitions and reduction
lemmas to being used only as items is twofold: First, since the
transformations made by the interpreter are truth value preserving
assuming our axioms of set theory (and in the case of conditional
items also assuming the particular sequent in which the sub-expression
being evaluated occurs) the resulting sequent is a theorem of our set
theory iff the original sequent was a theorem of our set theory.
Second, at least in the case of definitions (because after all they
are definitions and hence can be eliminated), we know that in a
certain sense the complexity of the resulting expression is less.
This fact, combined with the manner in which the sequent calculus
itself reduced the complexity of its sequents, means that the re¬
sulting expressions are becoming less complex. This systematic
reduction of complexity amounts to a searchless proof procedure
117
which tries to prove a theorem by developing one and only one path,
no matter how devious, through the deductive search space. Since
there are no infinitely descending chains of complexity, that is
one cannot go on applying definitions forever, if the original ex¬
pression was a theorem.then this path is guaranteed to terminate with
a proof.
Strictly speaking, this last remark is true only if the under¬
lying logic is complete which ours is not. Nevertheless in most
cases that occur in elementary set theory our' logical system, while
less explosive than a complete procedure for logic seems to be able
to handle the logical difficulties involved in finding a proof. A
complete version of our logic may be obtained by replacing our unify
schema by Prawitz's unification rule [11], and by replacing our = ->
schema by explicit axioms.
Furthermore, in the case of reduction lemmas such as <j> if, if
the <j> expression contains at least one symbol 'which was defined later
than any symbol in if, then it is quite probable, but not at all
'certain,, that the above termination property will hold. For example,
all the non-conditional reduction lemmas in Table 2 contain a later
defined symbol in their <f expression, and thus the use of such items
probably will reduce complexity. Thus our philosophy for using re¬
duction lemmas as items is basically the same as for our use of
definitions as items.
It should be noted that several people have considered the
problem of proving that various sets of reduction lemmas preserve
termination when used in this manner, notably Siekmann [14],
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Plotkin [153, and Lankford [163.
It should not be thought that the termination property must
hold in all cases for it to be useful to use reduction lemmas in this
manner, for it may be the case that it fails only for pathelogical
expressions which are of little interest in {mathematics. One simple
example comes to mind. Consider the contextual definition Q2P1 in
Table 2:
Vy(y c{x:fx) ++ Fy)
Seinantically, this definition means that for all y, y is an element
of the abstract of all x such that F x iff Fy, but as an item to be
used in evaluation, all this means is that any expression of the form:
ye{x:rx} where y is a variable (or a skolem function or a unification
variable in the framework of a sequent calculus) may be replaced by
the corresponding expression Fy.
Let R be some abstract which can be proven to be equal to some
variable y. Would it not then be useful to have a reduction lemma
of the form?
R E {x: <J)x} A
Clearly this lemma is indeed a theorem, for since R=y then it is
equivalent to Q2P2.
Consider now Zermelo-E'rankel set theory: From' the axiom of
foundation we learn that xgfx, and hence that {x:xex} is the null set
which clearly is equal to some variable by axiom Q7P10A of Table 3.
Letting R be: {x:xex} and cf>x be xex the above reduction lemma becomes:
{x:xex} e {x:xex} ■<-* {x:xex} £ {x:xex}
which clearly, could not possibly reduce complexity. Never-the-less,
119
the failure to reduce complexity in such a pathological case, should
not stop our interpreter from making use of this reduction lemma.
The existence axioms and the existence lemmas are used to
increase the range of applicability of the logical schema = -> the
contextual definition Q2P1 and of the reduction lemmas. Namely,
whenever an expression of the form R e V where R is some abstract
is either assumed or proven, then for every combination of variables
and abstracts X such that X e V is now known, new versions of Q2P1
and the reduction lemmas are asserted. For example, if R^ e V and
R^ e V are assumed then the new reduction lemmas corresponding to
Q2P1 are:
R^ e {x:Fx} ■<-* TR^
R^ e {x: Fx} -«-> TR^
and the new reduction lemmas corresponding to the reduction lemma
Q7P7 are:
{R1}={y} >1IIr—1Pi {rI }={R1> •t—y
{x}={Rl> i—iPiIIX {r2 }={R2} Vr2
{R2}=(y} R2=y {rIMr2} •4—y R1=r2
{x}={R2l x=R2 {R2 }={R1> R2=R1
A simpler method of implementing the addition of these new re¬
duction rules, is to agree that the initial universally quantified
variables of a definition or a reduction lemma are allowed to match,
not just variables, but also any abstract R such that R e V is known.
Note then that the new lemmas corresponding to the contextual
definition Q2P1 will be applicable only to formulas to which the
contextual definition Q5P5 is applicable. If we are ever to use
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these lemmas it is therefore necessary to require that we try to
apply these lemmas related to Q2P1 before trying to apply Q5P5.
Furthermore, in order to avoid an infinite circular oscillation
caused by the interaction between the new lemmas related to = -*
and Q5P5 schemata on hypotheses it is necessary to restrict Q5P5 to
being applied only it its first argument is not known to exist.
An example of this oscillation is:
(JieA ->
3y y=(j>- /\ yeA ->
a=<f> /\ aeA ->
<j)eA ->•
There is a rationale behind this restriction: Let S be an abstract.
Then Q5P5: Sea 3y y=S A yea means that S exists (because its
equal to some variable) and is in a. However, if we already know
that S exists, what would be the purpose in re-deducing this fact by
applying Q5P5? An example of the use of this restriction is in the
proof of theorem THS31 where Q5P5 is never applied to '<ab>e6', be¬
cause <ab> is known to exist.
There is one further way in which the existence axioms are used,
and this has to do with the fact that they are axioms. Clearly if
we wish to show that a theorem T is deducable from the axiom A then
unless our reduction lemmas, being truth value preserving in A,
implicitly introduce A, it will be necessary to assume A as a hypo¬
thesis. For this reason, if the interpreter gets "stuck" while
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trying to solve a sequent (that is, if no items can be applied to
that sequent) in proving T, it will in primitive notation add each
axiom A as an additional hypothesis in that sequent.
Fortunately this rarely has to be done because usually re¬
duction lemmas which are not logically valid, b\it only valid in our
set theory are used, and the axioms are thus implicitly used as they
are needed.
The, point about adding the axiom in its primitive notation,
that is with all the definitions eliminated is that, the defined
notation, often by interaction with lemmas will simply be reduced to
the true hypothesis " ". For example, Q7P10A if introduced at a
stage where 0 is known to be a set will reduce as follows:
0 e V -* :Q2P9
0 e {x:f3} -> :[Q2P1, Q7P10A]*
ESJ : Si ■* . '
->
On the other hand, if Q2P9 is introduced in primitive notation
then the unwanted reduction does not occur:
3y Vx (xey <-*■ n )
The point then, is that in some proofs it is necessary to have the
actual code of the axiom, even after lemmas such as: [Q2P1, Q7P10A]*
are available. The primitive notation of our axioms are given in
Table 6.
Table 6: Primitive notations of existence axioms
Q7P10A: 3y Vx^XeY
Q7P10B: VuVvily Vx xey x=u V x=v
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Q4P1 : (Vu uex +-*■ uey) Z> (Vx xez 'yez)
In section 2.1 we mentioned that the logical items could be
viewed as being instructions in a database manipulation language.
It turns out that this language, may be extended in that new in¬
structions may be defined in terms of the primitive logical ones.
For example, definition "a C~~ 3" does not split the database,
check to see if everything in a is in 3 in the first database and
then find something which is in 3 but not in a in the second data¬
base. Rather a 3 simply returns its definition a iu 3 A ^3 ~ a
and lets the mathematical interpreter perform these instructions
automatically using its previous definitions and logical items.
Again an informed reader will recall Bledsoe's set theory theorem
prover [4].
3. Examples
We give below a number of protocols produced by our theorem
prover while proving various theorems of set theory. We have listed
on the right the name of the item which was applied to each sequent in
the protocols. Any name which is starred: is the name of a
lemma. A list of names indicates the use of a reduction lemma
corresponding to the item named by the first name in the list, and
created by the items named by the remaining names in the list.
The proofs are presented as a tree of sequents, grown top down,
starting with the sequent containing only the theorem the system is
trying to prove. On each line of the proof the item name following
the colon indicates that that item was applied to the sequent on
that line, producing the sequent on the line immediately below that
123
one. In the case of a logical split item (-»- A , -e*, \/ -*•, 3 -*■,
-<-* ->) two sequents will be produced, and then they are indicated by
drawn arrows.
Each proof is segmented by the scope of attempted applications
of the Unify items. The boundaries of each segment are indicated
by stating where each segment starts. That is by starting:
:0, starts herek
where k refers to segment k. The system attempts to apply the Unify
item once to a sequence of all end sequents of each segment. Thus,
every sequent in the segment marked as having the Unify item applied
to it are jointly the conjunction of sequents to which the Unify
schema is actually applied.




THS6 The commutativity of intersection '
->a/AB = B/ha
-> Vx xea A p ■*-*■ xeB /I a
-> cea A B Ce$ A a
and
cea A B -* cep A a
ce{x: xea A xep} -> ce3 A a
cea A ce3 -+ ce3 A a
cea, cep -> ce3 A a
cea, cep ce{x: xeP A xea}
cea, cep -> ceP A cea
and
_
cea, cep -> cea
fer
cea, ceP ceP :atom
B
cep A a cea A p
ce{x: xeP A xea} -> cea A B
cep A cea cea A p
cep, cea cea A p
ceP, cea -> ce{x: xea A xeP}

















ceP, cea cea :atom cep, cea -> ceP :atom
time = 289 milliseconds
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Of course, if the theorem prover had already known that inter¬
section was commutative, that is if it had an item such as:
a n 3 = g /O a -«■ i
then the proof of THS6 would have been immediate. The point is
that all the theorem prover knows about intersection is its defin¬
ition, and it is this item which it is trying to prove.
In general then, the reader should bear in mind that our
theorem prover knows nothing about set theory other than the
definitions, axioms, and lemmas listed in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Thus, the ability of this theorem prover at proving theorems lies
not in having many special 'banana' lemmas* lying around which
give immediate proof, but rather in the general deductive power
of the mathematical interpreter and of the sequent logic.
An example of this deductive power can be seen in the next
example.
* A phrase coined by Hayes £17] suggesting the reason as to why a




THS101 The Cartesian product of two abstracts is contained in the
powerset of the powerset of their union.
-* axB £ PP (a (7 B) :Q2P2
-> Vx xeaxB xe PP (a *2 B)
_ '•-* v
->- ceaxB Cb ce PP(a \j B) :-»• D
ceaxB -*■ ce PP(a \J B) :Q9P11
ce{<xy>: xea A yep}-* ce PP(a 12 B) :Q9P4
ce{u:3x3y u=<xy> A xea A yeB} ce PP(a 12 B) :Q2P1
3x3y c=<xy> /\ xea A yeB ce PP(a 12 B) : 3 -»■
3y c=<ay> A aea A yep ce PP(a (.2 B) :3 ->
c=<ab> A aea A bep -> ce PP(a V B) = A"*
c=<ab>, aea A beB a- ce PP(a \J B) : C53"*"/ E23*
aea A bep a- <ab> e PP(a (7 B) : A
aea, beB <ab> e PP(a (2 B)
aea, bep -> <ab> e {u:u £ P(a L2 B) :[Q2P1, E2l*
aea, beB •*" <ab> £ P(a U B) :Q2P2
aea, bep -> Vx xe<ab> 3 xeP (a 12 B) V
aea, beB de<ab> deP(a U B) D
aea, beB, de<ab> -> deP(a 12 B) :Q9P1
aea, beB, de{{a}{ab}} a- deP (a 12 B) :Q7P1B
aea, beB, de{u:u={a} V u={ab}} -* deP(a 12 B) :Q2P1





aea, beg, d={a} V d={ab} -a- de{u: ug a t/ g} :Q2P1
aea, beg, d={a} V d={ab} -»■ d £ a t/ g : Q2P2
aea, beg, d={a} V d={&b} ->• Vx xed TP xea \J g :->• V
aea, beg, d={a} V d=(ab} -> eed t? eea L/ g 3
aea, beg, d={a} V d={ab} , eed -a- eea \J g : Q2P4
aea, beg, d={a} V d={ab} , eed ee{x: xea V xeg} :Q2P1
aea, beg, d={a} V d={ab} , eed -> eea V eeg :-»• V
aea, beg, d={a} V d={ab} , eed -a- eea, eeg
aea, beg, d={a}, eed -a- eea, ee£
aea, beg, ee{a} eea, eeg
aea, beg, ee{x: x=a} -> eea, ee£
aea, beg, e=a •> eea, eeg
aea, beg -a- aea, aeg
(, beg, d={ab}, eed -> eea, eeg
aea, beg, ee{ab} -a- eea, eeg
t, beg, ee{x: x=a V x=b} -a- eea, eef













aea, beg, e=a -a- eea, eeg
aea, beg -> aea, aeg : atom
aea, beg, e=b ->- eea, eeg := -*■
eea, beg -> bea, beg :atom
time = 626 millisec
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The four names in this proof which were starred represent
reduction lemmas which were created from the knowledge that the ab¬
stracts {a}, {a(3}, and <otf3> are sets. Once these abstracts are known
to be sets the proof of this theorem proceeds without any redundant
steps. On the other hand if this knowledgef were not already avail¬
able it would have been quite difficult to prove this theorem: for
essentially the theorem prover would have had to stop the proof where
each of these items were used, create and prove one of the sentences
{a}sV, {a3)eV, <a3>eV, then use this theorem to create new reduction
■lemmas and then proceed with the proof until it reached the place,
where the next one of these starred items was applied, and so forth.
As this phenomena appears when trying to prove many theorems
of set theory, we make the following conclusion. It appears to be
the case that many theorems cannot be easily proven until the
theorem prover has acquired a certain level of knowledge (in this
case in terms of reduction lemmas as existence lemmas ) about the
domain in which it is working.
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Example 3
Q8P11: The infinite intersection of the union of two abstracts is
the intersection of the infinite intersections of those two
abstracts.
Merely for the purposes of presenting the protocol of this
theorem in this document we make three abbreviations which have
nothing to do with the theorem prover.
(l) =df (Vy yea L/ B Tj aey)
(g) =df (Yy yea "D aey)
(3) =df (Vy ye£3 ID aey)
-»• ae
ae /I a f B ae /0 a ^
ae{x:Vy yea f f 3 xey} -* ae /0 a r~\ /0
•0 a n /Obae(Vy yea L/ B 3 aey) ->
(p -> ae{x: xe (0 a A xe C\ B>
(l) + ae /I a A ae /I B
<1) ^ae/la :Q8P9
(I) -* ae{x: Vy yea xey} :Q2P1
(l) -* Vy. yea D aey V
: Q8P9
(l) •> bea aeb
4-
D
(!)"-> ae (0 B
© a- ae{x: Vy yeB D xey} :Q2P1
(±) Vy yeB ^ aey :•* V





The two following steps marked unify are actually a single step
producing [*^=b]
(T) , *gea U 0 D ae*6' kEot aek : ->
[* =b]
6
(T) , bea. -»- ^ 3f aeb :Q2P4 (T) , ae*^, bea -> aeb :Unify
(l) , bea *^e:{x: xea' V xeg},aeb :Q2P1
Q) , bea -> V *geg, aeg V




(T) , ceg -*■ aec :V ■> -
The two following steps marked Unify are actually a single step
producing [* =c]b
_ea U P D ae* , ceB aEC
ceg *5ea \J g, aec
[*5=c]
:Q2P4 (1) , ae*^, ceg aec :Unify
, ceg -> *5e'{x: xea V xeg},aec :Q2P1
(T) , ceg -> * ea V *ceg, aec Vbo





ae .'la /h /I B + ae D a 1/ ^ :Q2P5
ae{x: xe O a A xe f\ g} ae a 13 g :Q2P1
ae /0 a /\ ae /) g ■> ae /I a U g : A
ae /I a, ae /I 3 + ae f) a ^ g :Q9P9
ae{ x: Vy yea 3 xey}, ae / ) g + ae /I a U g : Q2P1
(Vy yea 3 aey) , ae D P + ae /) a U g :Q9P9
© , ae{x: Vy yeg 3 xey} -»- ae f\ a [y g :Q2P1
© / (Vy yeg 3 aey) ae f\ a \J g • : Q8P9
© , Q) -> ae{x: Vy yea L/ g P xey} :Q2P1
© # © (Vy xea *3 g 3 aey) V
© , (3) -> dea 13 g 3 aed :->■ 3
0 , © , dea U g + aed :Q2P4
© , © , de{x: xea V" xeg} -> aed :Q2P1
© , © , dea V deg -> aed :V->
:02 starts here:
© , 0 , dea -> aed :V ->
0, 0 , *3e^ ae*3' <3ea aed :V
The four following steps marked Unify are actually a single step
producing [*4=d3
©' Q)> *^ea 3 ae*^, *3e^ ae*3' dea aed :
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(D ' CD ' *oE& ae%' <3ea a£d, *.Ea 0->
(2), (3), dea -> aed, *^ea,*^Eg :Unify (2) , (3) , ae*^,dea ->• aed,*4ea4
:Unify
« C* =d]
4 JS E*4=<33 or f*3=d]
■D"
(2) , (3) , ae*^, *2^3 ^ ae*^, dea ■> aed ' :0 ->
A^




C* =d] or [* =d]
4 3
:6 starts here:
(2) , (3) , deg -> aed :V ->
(2) , (J) , ^eg D ae*lf deg -> aed :V ->
The four following steps marked Unify are actually a single step
producing [*^=d]
CD ' Q) ' *1e3 3 az*lt deg aed, *2ea : 3 -»•
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(2) , (3), deB -> aed, *2ea> *1£& :Unify @ , (0 , ae*^, deB -> aed, 2
-•Unify
[*1=d] S3 [* =d]
0,0, ae*2, *1eB 3 ae* , deB -»• aed : D ->
(5) , (J) v ae*2' ae<^' =Unify (2) , (3) , ae*2,ae*^,deB aed
:Unify
M C*^=d] or [*2=d] @ [*^=d] or [* =d]
time = 1,161 milliseconds
Note that the initial sequent where 00 starts is broken down
into four independent sequents which are solved in the parts of the
proof known respectively as 01, 02, 03 and 04. Note also that the
Unify rule was needed to solve these four subgoals, but that the
V -> and -* 3 items were never applied more than once to any formulae
in any sequent, that is no quantifier list e.g. 3(x* .. .) ever
contains more than one unification variable.
In the next example we shall see that multiple instances of
some formulae are sometimes needed in order to prove a theorem.
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Example 4
Q6P10: Russell's paradox and Quine1s more complicated version. We
prove that these "paradoxical" abstracts are not sets.
In order to present this protocol the following abbreviations
are made:
.. r
(1) =df (Vx.xeoi -<-> xe{x:^xex})
(2) =df (Vx.xeb <-y xe{x:^3y xey A yex})
(3) =df (3y.*1eyA ye*1>
(?) =df (3y. c ey A ye c )




3y y={x:^xe3t} A yeV-* :3 +
a={x:^xex} A aeV-> : A -y
a={x:'vxex}, aeV-> :Q2P7
Vx xea y-y xefxi'Vxex}, aeV-> :Q2P9
(T) , ae{x: S3 } :Q2P1
Q , n
:05 starts here [*,_:=a]




■> MxiMy xey A yex}e V i<
{x:^3y xey A yex}e V :Q5P5
'3y y={x:^3y xey A yex} A yeV -> :3
b={x:^3y xey A yex} A beV -> :A->
b={x:My xey A yex} , beV :Q2P7
(Vx xeb xe{x:^3y xey A yex}) , beV -> :Q2P9
(2) , be{x: H } -> :Q2P1
(2) , H -> :« ->
4- ? 01 starts here:
(2) -> : V "t




(2) , * efxt^y xey A yex}
(2) , *1eb, ^3y *1ey A ye*
: Q2P1
:o> -»■
:02 starts here [* =b, *2=b3
(2) *,eb ■> 3y *, ey A ye*1 1 1
(2) ,*lEb -> *lE*2 A *2e*1# (3)
3
A
(2), *^eb *1e*2, @ :Unify (2), *2e*l' ^ :Unify





© •> *lEb, *^E{x:^3y xEy A yEx}
(2) -> *^eb, 'vBy *^ey A ye*^
(2) , 3y *, ey A ye*, -* *, ebv 1 11
(2) , *^(0*^ A (c*1)£*1 -> *Leb
©, * e(c* ), (c* )e* -*• * Eb
1
:03 starts here producing a second copy of (2>
a>. bee, ceb -> bEb :V






(2) , *3e5:)/ *2e'tx:'v'3y xey A yex}, bee, ceb beb
(2) , *2eb' *3e^ ^ ye*3' bec' ceb keb
(2) , bee, ceb -> beb, (3y c ey A yec )
:04 starts here [* :=b]
(2) , bee, ceb -> beb, 3y cey A yec
(2) , bee, ceb beb, ce*^ A *^ec, <D














(!) , bee, ceb ->• beb, *^eb,*^e{x:^3y xey A yex}
(!) , bee, ceb -> beb, ^eb, ^y *3ey ^ ye*3
(1) , bee, ceb, By ^ey A ye*^ beb, ^eb
(D r bee, ceb, *^ed*3 A d*3e*3 beb,











Q8P16 The intersection of all things in the universe is the nullset.
This protocol illustrates the addition of the axioms as extra
hypotheses in a sequent.
The following abbreviations are used:
(1) = df (Vy yeV ZD aey)
(2) = df(Vy Vz (Vx xey 3 xez) ZD (Vw yew ZD zew))
(3) = df VxVy 9w Vu uew -«-> u=x V u-y
(|) = df Vu ^ ueb - -
(Vy 5w Vu uew u=*^ V U=Y)
(Vz (Vx xe*r-f-> xez) (Vw *ew ZD zew))
5 5
:Q2P7
-> Vx xe / tv xe0 V
-* ae ae0 -*-*
ae 0 V"* ae0f lV"*" :Q8P9 ae0 ■> ae :Q2P8
ae{x:Vy ye V"* xey} ZD ae0 :Q2Pl ae{x:n } ae/lV :Q2P1











:02 starts here (1} -> * e V"'
© , ae*1 ->
© , *2eVr ^ae*2, ae*1





:03 starts here (l) , ae*, -> *„e1 2




© , ae*^, ae*2, (Vy Vz (Vx xey -«-> xez) 3 (Vw yew O zew)) ,
(3w Vu 'Maew) , (VxVy3wVu uew ■*-»- u=x V u=y)
:04 starts here
© , ae*1, ae*2, (2) , ©) , Vu^ ueb ->
© ^ © > © / © , ae*lf ae*2, (Vy3w Vu uew u=*3 V u=y)
© r © / <D , , <§) , ae*1, ae*2, ^eb
© / © , (3) , ® , (D , ae*x, ae*2, ^eb,
(Vz (Vx xe*^-<~> xez) 3 (Vw*,.ew z> zew) ) -*■
© , © , © / <D , © , © , ae*1, ae*2 -> *4eb






time = 426 milliseconds
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Example 6
Q28P17 Cantor's Theorem: The cardinality of any abstract a is less
than the cardinality of its power abstract, provided that
a A{y:^y£w'y} is a set.
In order to present this protocol the following abbreviations
are made:
@ = df (Vw a {y:^yew'y} e V)
(?) = df (Vx xe Pa -> xe f"a)
(?) = df (Vx xe(a*2) xea A\ {y:^y e" *2''y})
@ = df (Vx xe (a*2^ xeV;,(b*2)
-> (Vw a r\ {y^yew'y} e V) a < Pa D
(Vw a {yr^ycw'y} e V) -> a < Pa :Q20P3
^ Pa ^ a :-»■ 'v
Q , Pa ^ a •> : Q11P1
(1) , -3x Func x A pa C x"a -> ■>
(l) , Func -f A pa — -f"'a -*■ : A->
@ , Feme Pa ^ -f"a -> :Q2P2
:01 starts here
, Func , (Vx xePa 3 xe/"a) -> :V -»■
(l) , Func "f, *^ePa 30 *^e/"a, (2) -> :V ■>
(I) , (?) , Func f, a /A {y:^ye*2 'y}eV, *^ePa 30> *^e/"a -> :Q5P5
(J), (?), Func 3x x=a O {y:^ye*2'y} A xeV,
*^ePa 30 * ef"a :3 ->■
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<9. Q) , Func -fr, (a*2)=a A {y:^ye*2 'y} A (a*2)eV,
*^ePa -A *^ef'a -> : A ->
©' (2) , Func ■£, (a*2)=a /A {y:^ye*2'y}, (a*2)eV,
* ePa * ef'u -> :Q2P9
®' (5), Func f, (a*2)=a <A {y:^yc*2'y},
(a*2)e{y: ®}, * ePa Z2> ^erP'ot -> : Q2P1
(2) , Func f, (a*2)=a O {y:^ye*2'y}, ^ ,
*^ePa * ef'a -> : Q2P7
(2) , Func (Vxr xe (a*2) xea A {y :^ye*2 1 y}) ,
© , *^ePa lb *^ef"a ■> : m ->
© , (2) , Func -f-, (3.) , *^ePa ^ *^ef"a ->• : D ->
©'
MQIIit-
(2) , (3) , Func A * ef'a -> :Q9P14
Q. (2) , (3) , Func /, *^e{x:3y<xy>ef A yea} :Q2P1
© , © , Func -f, 3y <*^y>e^ A yea ->■ :3 +
GK (2) , (3) , Func •/, <*^(b*1)> ef A (b* )ea -> : A
(2) , (3) , Func 4, <*1(b*1)> erf, (b*1)ea -> :CRL1*
© , (2) , (3) , Func A *1=/' (b*^) , (b*1)ea -> :Q2P7
© , (1) ' © » Func f, (Vx xe* +-*■ xef' (b* )) , (b* ) ea -*■ :propagation_L XX
from 02
:03 starts here
(p > © / © / Feme -f, (Vx xe (a*2^ xe^' (b*2^ ^ '
(b*2)ea -> : V ->
© ' (D, ©, Func rf, <g> , *4e(a*2) ^*4e/'(b*2),
(b*2)ea -> :V -»■
©- ©/ ©' © ' F11110 A *5e(a*2) ^ *5ea/0*
{y :^ye* *y}*4e (a*2) ■/*-»- *4ef'(b*2), (b*2)ea ->
"A" "B"
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2), (T), Func -f r * e (a* ) ,* eot /*) {y.^ye* 'y),
*4e(a*2) *4e/'(b*2), (b*2)ea ' :Q2P5
CD' (D ' Q) ' Func (a* ) ,* e{x:xeaA xefyi^ye* 'y}},
*4e(a*2) -w- *4e/'(b*2), (b*2)eot ->
(2) , (3) , (4) , Func f, *5e (a*2) ,*5ea A*5e{y:^ye*2'y}
*4e(a*2)^ *4e/' (b*2) , (b*2)ea +
:Q2P1
: A
© ' (D ' (D ' Func A *Re (a*2) , *5ea,*qe{y :^ye*9'y>
*4e(a*2) -«->■ *4e^'(b*2), (b*2)ea -> : Q2P1
d) ' Q) ' (D ' Func A *sE^a*2^'*5ea'^*5e*2,*5
*4e(a*2) *4e-/'(b*2), (b*2)ect -> :^X/
© ' ® ' @ ' Func -A *[_e (a*2) ,*5ea ,*4e (a*2)-<->*4e^'(b*2) ,' 4
(b*2)Ea + *5e*2'*5
(b*2)Ec - *5£*2' *5 :Unify
i*y, v*5- v<bv]







Q r Q) , (3) , Q , Func f, *4e (a*2) «-»- *ft' (b*2) ,
(b*2)ea -> *5e(a*2), *5ea {y:^ye*2'y}
(D , (2) , (3) , (§) , Func f, *4e (a*2) *->- (b*2) >
(b*2)ca -> *j.e(a*2), *,_e{x :xe.a A xe{y:^yp*2'y}}
© ' 0 ' 0 ' © ' Func f, *4e (a*2) •<-> * ^b*2^ '
(b*2)ea -> *5e(a*2), *5ea A *5e{y :^ye*2'y}
CP ' 0 ' © ' (D > Func A *4e (a*2) -*-> *Azf '(b*0) ,
(b*2) ea *5e (a*2J ' *5ea
© , (D / © , <D , Func A *4e (a*2) , *4ef (b*2) ,
(b* ) ca -> *ce (a*) , * eaA D A D
C*4=*5] or C*5=(b*2)3








© ' 0 ' 0 ' <© , Func -f, *4e (a*2) *->■ *4ef' (b*2) ,
(b*2)ea -»■ *5e(a*2), *5e{y:^ye*2'y}
Qr ©' ©' ©' Func i, *4e(a*2) *-> *4e#'(b*2),




(D , d> , Func *4E(a*2) *4e£' (b*9) ,
(b*2)Ea' VV*5 " V(aV
(g), (3), Func *, * e(a* ), * ef (b* ) , (b* )ea,
* e* 1 * -> * r (a* )
5 2 5 5 1 2 :Unify
[*.=*_]
4 5




(2) , d) , Func -f c Pa :D1
<D r (D< Func -f- *^e{x:x£ a} :Q2P1
(D ' a. Func •$ -> Q. a : Q2P2
(D' Q , Func ■/ ~y Vx xe*^ F5 xea V
(D, 6). Func ~f (c*1)e*1 7D (c*1)ea
:02 starts here
© f C3) , Func f, (c^Je* •> (c*1)ea :V ->
(2) , (3) , *3e(a*2) +-> *3ea r\ {y:^y£*2'y>,
Func (c*^)e*^ -> (c*^)Ea
"D"
(2), d) , *3£(a*2)' *3ea ^ {y;a'ye*2,y},
Func i, (c*^)e*^ -> (c*^)ea :Q2P5
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©. ©. ©. * e(a* ), * e{x:xect A xe{y:^yc* 'y}},
Func f, (c* )ea
CD' 0' (3) , *.^E (a*2) f *3£a A*3E{y:^ye*2,y},
Func f, (c*^)e*1 -*,(c* )ea
0 , © / (!), *3e(a*2)., *3ec1' *3£{y:rbYE*2 'y> ,
Func -f, (c*1)e*1 -*■ (c* )ea
CD/ 0. (3), *3e(a*2}' *3ea' <V*3e*2' *3'
Func ~f, (c*2^e*i (c* )ea




0 , (2), (3), Func f, (c*1)e*1 -> (c*1)ea, *3(a*2^
*3ea /A {y:^ye*2'y}
© / 0 ' 0 ' Func * > (c*1)e*1 -> (c*1)ca> *3e (a* ^) ,
*3e{x:xeot /\ xe{y:^ye*2 1 y}}










0 , 0, <3) , Func f, (c^e*^ -> (c*1)ea, *3c(a*2), *3£a :Unify
©/ @/ ©/ Func -f, (c*^)e*^ (c*^)eci, *3e (a*2)
*3e{y:',"ye*2,y} :Q2P1
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CD* Q. ©, Func -f, (c*^)e*^ (c*1)£a, *^e(a*2),
r\j* p* > * r\,
3 2 3
©' @ ' (P ' Func (C*1)E*1' *3e*2*3 (c*^) ea,
*3e^a*2^ :Unify
« C*l= (a*2} ' V(cY-]
time = 1,494 milliseconds or approximately \h seconds
1.47
Note that two distinct instantiations of formulae(3; have been used:
Variable Formulae Instantiation Branch of Proof
*1 (2j a (02)
*2 © # V03>
'*3 ® ° 02
*4 ® - . » ' ®3
*5 <D b e3
A theorem prover which:
(1) immediately skolemized its formulae-and
(2) allowed no more than one instance of each variable
would not be able to prove this theorem except by a very lucky
accident.
The basic problem of this proof is at the start of 01: and is
to decide which of the following two formulas to work on first.
(1) a r\ (y:^ye *2 'y} ev
(2) sPa 3 * e-/" a
If one begins by splitting on (2) then on each branch of the
search space formulae (1) will reduce to
3x x=a {y:^ye*2 'y) A xeV
which produces on each branch a distinct* skolem function (a*2^'
(a'* ), and this will not lead to a proof. Thus one must begin
* It is not obvious that two quantifiers on different branches of
the search space could be replaced by the same gensymed skolem
function, in a system with Unification variables because instantiat¬
ing them can cause these skolem functions to appear in the same sequent.
148
working on the first formulae. However, this first formulae in a
few steps reduces to (3). If (3) is immediately replaced by a
single Unification variable, then again no proof will be obtained,
for we have seen that from our proof that two variables and
bound to distinct skolem functions c and b were needed.
Thus what one must do is to start on formulae CD f then switch to
formulae (2) and split, and then come back on each branch and in¬
stantiate (1) .
The trickyness of these logical operations is, we feel, one
reason why Cantor's theorem is so surprising.
In set theories such as ZF (Zermelo Fraenkel) Cantor's theorem
is usually thought of as the sentence: that each set have smaller
cardinality than its powerset:
¥x x < Px
and indeed this sentence is easily derived from Quine's version of
Cantor's theorem which we have just proven.
Vw a {yi'vyew'y} eV a<Pa
For if a is a set x:
Vw x /~\ {y:^yew'y} eV x<Px
the hypothesis of this implication is an instance of the Assonderrung
axiom of ZF.
Vx x B £ V
and hence is true in ZF. Thus, by modus pones it follows that
x<Px is also true in ZF.
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4. Results
Our main purpose in implementing this theorem prover was to
see how well it performed as an extensible deductive system. That
is, as a system which starting from the axioms of a theory proceeds
by successively proving a theorem and then assimulating what it has
just proven thus creating an extension of the previous system from
which further theorems may be proven.
To be clear we point out that this work is not primarily con¬
cerned with the process of assimulating a theorem and creating an
extension* and in fact these processes of theory construction are
not carried out by this theorem prover, but were merely preset by
the author. Rather, our work is primarily concerned with whether
the deductive aspects of such a process can in fact be carried out.
For this reason, what we did was to take Quine's book. Set
Theory and its Logic Cl], and try using our theorem prover to
automatically prove the theorems in that book in the same order in
which they were proven in that book not assuming as extra knowledge
any theorems of set theory which had not already been proven at that
point in the book.
For any theorem in Quine's book the reader will be able to
determine exactly which lemmas listed in Table 3 and Table 5 of
Section 2 were used to prove it, by simply noting whether the name
of the lemma precedes the name of that theorem. For example,
* e.g. the choice of theorems to assimulate, how a theorem is
assimulated.
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the name of the theorem Q6P10 is "Q6P10'' which indicates that it
is the tenth numbered formulae in Chapter 6 of Quine's book. Like¬
wise the lemma Q6P4 is the fourth numbered formulae of Chapter 6
and hence precedes Q6P10. Thus it is assumed when the system
tries to prove Q6P10. On the other hand the lemma Q7P7 occurring
in Chapter 7 succeeds Q6P10 and hence is not. assumed when trying
to prove Q6P10. There are also a number of miscellaneous theorems
either unnumbered or not occurring in Quine's book. The names of
these theorems begin with the letters "TH", and all the lemmas in
Tables 3 and 5 were assumed when trying to prove these theorems.
Our results were as follows: Skipping over the first four
chapters of Quine's book which contained no numbered formulae, we were
able to prove in an extensible fashion fifty-six out of sixty theorems
in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. A summary of results for each chapter
is given in Table 7 and individual results for each theorem which was
proven are given in Table 8. The six theorems in these five chapters
which the theorem prover failed to prove are given in Table 9.
We believe that failure to prove these six theorems was not due
to the lack of relevant set theoretic lemmas, but rather due to the
incompleteness of the underlying sequent logic caused by the forcing
restriction. Finally, in Table 10 we list individual results of a
few other theorems the system has proven.
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Table 7: Summary of results of Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 in Quine's
book: Set Theory and its Logic. (Note: there were no numbered
theorems in Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4.)




Q6 16 16 0
Q7 , 12 9 3
. S3 21 19 2
Q9 7 6 1
Table 8: Theorems Proven in book order
Name Theorem Conses time (ms) Sequentsi Unify GC Axi:
Q5P1 a={x: rx}<-*(Vx xeot*->rx) 1,059 302 43 4 0
Q5P2 a={x:xea} 192 48 9 0 0
Q5P3 VyWx (xey*->^x£x) 283 85 10 1 0
Q5P4 Vy Vx (xey-e-MV' (3y xeyAyex)) 1,827 539 29 4 0
Q6P1 Vy fy-<->(3x x=yATx) All 130 18 1 1
Q6P2 Vy Ty-^CVx x=y3 Tx) 481 138 18 1 0
Q6P3 aeB-^-(3x x=aAxe0) 10,034 5,105 153 6 o
Q6P4* a=a 145 57 7 0 o
Q6P5 a=8-e->-3=a 1,258 366 39 4 0
Q6P6 (a=B A<f>a) 3 65 25 5 O 0
Q6P7 a=B 15 {) 86 51 7 0 o
Q6P8 Vx xeV 99 44 3 o 0






Conses time(ms) Sequents Unify GC Axic
v[x:vly xeyAyex}eV 2,743 773 56 5 0 -
Q6P11 ((aeVAVx (j>x) 3 cj>a) /\
((aeVA^a) 13 3xtf>x) 551 177 23 2 0 A
Q6P12 aeg .D aeV 200 > 64 8 O 0 -
Q6P13 ae{x:<jjx}-<->-aeV A<f>a 418 167 21 0 0 -
Q5P14 ^ae0 167 72 7 O 0 -
Q6P15 Vx. xea-e->a=V 850 284 34 2 0 -
Q6P16 Vx Fx-e->{x: rx}-V' 1,271 411 56 4 o -
Q7P2 'vaeV-<-Ka}=0 1,494 456 47 2 o -
Q7P3 (aegA Vx<j>x) O <f>oi 257 271 io 1 0 -
Q7P4 VxVy { x } S y-*~hxey 849 271 23 1 0 ~
Q7P5 VxVyVz{x y}^z-<-+xEz,\yez 2,260 742 66 2 0 -
Q7P6 VxVy xe{x)Axe{x y)Aye{x y} 558 182 17 0 0
Q7P7* VxVy { x }={ yh->x=y 2,407 945 67 2 0 -
Q7P8* VxVyVz{x y}={z}-e>x=z A y-z 8,722 3 ,717 252 4 0 -
Q7P9* VxVyVz{x y}={x w}-e->y=w 21,167 14 ,132 620 6 1 -
Q7PH Vx3y xey 80,370 58 ,331 72 6 9 A
Q8P2 Vx U"tx}=x 1,028 335 24 1 0 -
Q8P3 VxVy [Ax iyy) = t'x A Uy 3,303 1 ,038 63 4 0 -
Q8P4 VxVy U'{xy}=5iuy 2,607 873 69 2 0 -
Q8P5 Aa — g«-> (Vx xea :o x £ g) 2,137 667 35 4 0 -
Q8P6 Vx xea 3 x C l/a 522 171 . 12 1 0 -
Q8P7 U0=0 434 167 11 0 0 -
Q8P8 L;v=v 81,093 63 ,456 91 6 9 A
Q8P10 Vx /l{x}=x 1,047 366 24 1 0 -
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Name Theorem Conses time(ms) Sequents Unify GC Ax 3 (
Q8P11 f\a c 6= /lan/le 3,203 1,161 61 4 O -
Q8P12 VxVy/l(xy}=xny 2,667 1,026 69 2 0 -
Q8P13 3 ct f]a-e->-(Vx xea^BSx) 2,166 2,218 35 4 0 -
Q8P14 Vx xea T>/la£x 523 7-89 12 1 0 -
Q8P15 f)0=V 608 252 14 O 0 -
Q8P16 /I V=0 1,234 426 25 4 0 A
Q8P17 Vy- (Vx Dc<->x=y) D ( U{x:Fx}=y
A A{x:rx}=y) 3,548 1,341 99 4 o _
Q8P19*Vy (Vx rx*-*x=y)0 -9xFx=y 12,133 7,113 231 4 1 -
Q8P20 Vy Vz (Vx Fx<->x=y) 3
(rz^->z= 7zfz) 114,892 78,229 1,044 22 JL3 -
Q8P21 Vy y= ?x(x=y) 2,279 801 57 2 0 -
Q8P22*(^3yVx Tx<-^x=y) //xFx=0 7,059 3,318 148 3 o -
Q9P2 VxVyVuVv<xy>=<uv> 3 x=uAy=v 1,225 408 42 O 0
Q9P3* VxVyVuVv<xy>=<uv>-e->x=u Ay=v 1,601 432 47 O 0 -
Q9P5* VzVw<zw>e{<xy> : Fxy }-*->!zw 1,564 457 35 2 0 -
Q9P7 °a=a °V 1,905 595 27 0 0 -
Q9P8 °a — 8-^(VxVy<xy>£a 3<xy>e3) 3,096 968 46 5 o -
Q9P10 °{<xy>:Txy}={<xy>:Fxy} 1,851 607 31 0 0 -
*These theorems are needed in order to justify lemmas in Tables 3 and
5 which were used in proving later theorems.
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Q7P14 cx=z -<-> Vx zex 3 aex • »
Q8P23 xtjixeV'
Q8P24 Vy((Vx <j>x -<-> x-y) TO tpC) x<|>x))
Q9P9 °a-°B -*-*■ Vx Vy <xy>ea -«->■ <xy>e(3
Table 10: Some miscellaneous theorems which have been proven,
Name Theorem Conses time (bis) Sequents Unify
Q10P3 Func 0 1,091 367 21 0
Q10P4 Func I A(arg I) = "V* 3,702 1,203 69 1
Q10P5 Vx Vy Func {<xy>} 2,482 1,352 43 0
QlOP9 arg a "c: a " V 1,466 478 29 1
Q10P19 Vx I 'x = x 3,066 1,095 61 2
Q10P20 0 'a = 0 1,261 435 25 1
Q28P17 Vw ex /\{yr'v-yew y}eV,^a<Pa 4,621 1,494 76 3
THS1 (a U 6 = a LAS V 6) 1,440 472 " 42 0
THS2 a iy 3 = 6 t ' a 805 280 25 0
THS3 a U a = a 482 169 15 0
THS4 a U 0 = ct 520 178 16 0
THS5 (a A B) A 6 = aA (3 A 6) 1,489 495 42 0
THS6 a A 6 = BAa 832 289 25 0
THS7 a A a = a 502 147 16 0
THS8 a 0 = 0. 434 148 13 0
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Name theorem
THS22 Vx Vy {x} \J {y} r= {x y}
THS31 6" (aUB) = (6 "a) \J (6" g)
THS32 v Ua = a
THS101 a x 3SP P(a 17 3)
Qonses time (ms) Sequents Unify
2,176 753 67 0
3,534 1,183 61 4
1,840 612 21 O
2,184 626 41 0
5. Implementation
Our theorem prover is implemented in three modules of LISP [9]
code. The first module SYEV5 consists of the symbolic interpreter
for mathematical symbols described in Section 2, and the sequent
logic described in Section 2.1. It also includes another experi¬
mental logic system which,however, has not been used in proving any
of the results given in this paper. The second module SETl consists
of the set theory axioms and lemmas described in Section 2.2, and
also a few top level user routines related specifically to set theory.
The third module contains all the definitions and theorems listed in
Sections 2 and 4. The size of each of these three modules is listed
in Table 11 along with their contribution to the run time structure °f
the theorem prover.
Our theorem prover was initially developed several years ago to
run in about a 35k Stanford AI LISP 1.6 system [18]. We subsequently
modified our theorem prover to run, as of September 1976, in a 45k
UCI LISP system [19]. Our theorem prover can of course be run in
much less space than this at the expense of extra garbage collections
but it runs very well in this much space.
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Workspace in 45k system



















Total: 7,168 15,662 1,434
Total space used by theorem prover: 24,264




1. One block is 512 words of disc storage.
2. One k is 1024 words of core memory.
3. The Edinburgh implementation of UCI LISP does not contain all
the functions as specified by the UCI LISP manual [18]. This
perhaps explains why the size of our AI LISP interpreter is
about 3k short of the 24k size (14k high segment, 8k low seg¬
ment) specified by that manual.
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The times given in the last section (Section 4) were obtained
during September 1976 on a DEC10-KA10 with SYEV5 and SET1 compiled,
with NOUUO-nil, and without storing the proof onto the disc for
later examination. The compilation times given in Table 11
however were obtained using a DECIO-KIIO. .(Our DECIO was upgraded
in October 1976) .
6. Conclusions
We have described an automatic theorem prover for the domain of
elementary set theory, and have presented some protocols of its be¬
haviour when proving some theorems . We wish to stress that the
program is fast and compact. For example, we have seen that it took
less than 2 seconds to obtain a proof of Cantor's Theorem. We have
also seen that it is fairly successful at proving a limited number of
successive theorems in a book, in an extensible fashion. In partic¬
ular, we have seen that it was able to prove in an extensible manner,
most of the theorems in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Quine's book Set
Theory and its Logic.
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VI Conclusions
We have argued that the improved performance of modern theorem
provers is due basically to the use of domain dependent deductive
knowledge possessing certain simple properties. We have exemplified
this thesis by discussing various theorem provers for the propositional
logic and elementary arithmetic. In particular we have implemented
a deductive knowledge system for the domain of elementary arithmetic
which is. based on the use of rules possessing these properties.
We then have argued that domain dependent deductive knowledge
systems, such as our arithmetic theorem prover, are not the kind of
deductive system that is needed as a component of a general mathe¬
matical reasoning system. The reason for this being that such
systems are not extensible in that they cannot assimulate and use
new deductive knowledge created by a mathematical reasoning system.
Finally, we have described a prototype deductive knowledge system
for the domain of elementary set theory which is extensible in this
.sense.
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Appendix 1: Consistency of our Sequent Logic
We will prove that the following rules of our sequent logic are
consistent: ->A, -»V, ->V, ->-3, -HJnify. Proofs of the consistency
of the remaining rules may be obtained analogously.
These proofs will be carried out in the second order logic that
Frege used in Begriftschrift. in particular the skoi em functions:
f used in our logic will be represented as universally quantified
function faviables V/. In these proofs:
(1) V/ represents a sequence of universal quantifiers: V/ ...Vr .
x n
(2) 3jj[_ represents a sequence of existential quantifiers:
(4) <J> when it occurs within a sequent represents a sequence
of formulas <J> , otherwise it represents a1 n
conjunction of formulas.
(5) i|> when it occurs within a sequent represents a sequence of
formulas, otherwise it represents a disjunction Qf
formulas,
Recall that a sequent (<j> -> iJj) or rather: (d> ,...,<{> ij> . .. )1 n 1 n
is interpreted as:
(<J> 3 or rather: (cf> A...A<f> iAv. . .Vf* )X n X n
We will now prove the consistency of each of the above six rules in
succession:
4 * 4 *J _ • • • J •
1 n
(3) S represents a conjunction of sequents: S^a. ..aS^.
-*A V/ 3 * { , A (<J> + V / (*- A B) ) ) def of sequent
v£ 3* (S A (<P D ■, B) ) ) logic
V/ 3 * ( S A v> 3 r ))) logic
V/ /'\ 3 y (ip V B) ) def of sequent
V/ 3* '' A (g ,3) )
•V vf 3MS A(^I,(AVB)))
Vf 3 MS A (y 7> y VA v b))
Vf 3* (S A (0 -»■ V, A, b) )
: def of sequent
: def of sequent
'V yf 3*_(s_ a (<t> + y, ^ a) )
Vf 3 MS A (<J> 2> V ^ a)))
vz. a((* a a) 3 y))
vf 3 MS A (<i>, a -»■ y))
: def of sequent.
: logic
: def of sequent
yf 3ms_ a (y y# vxPx))
v£ 3I^£ A(y Z> (y v (VxPx)) ))
yf 3M£ a (<j> 7? (y v(VaPa))})
V£ 3* (S A (♦ 73 Va (y v Pa)) )
v£ 3I<£ A Va(<j> 7) (fvPa)))
Vf 3j£ Va(S A (y 7> (y v/ Pa) )
Vf 3j£ Va(S A (<f> -> y, Pa) )
Vf 3* . .3* Va(S A (y -> y, Pa) )^ n
Vf 3* ...3* . Va 3* (s A (y -»• y, P (a* ) ) )
— 1 n-1 .. n — 1
Vf 3* Va 3* . .3* (S A (y -> y P (a* . . .* . ) ) )
— 1 2 n — T 1 n-1
Vff Va 3*1<..3*n(s A (y + y< P (a* .
vf Va 3 MS A (y -*■ y, P(a* ...*)))
)))
def of sequent




since u. cue s .. ^ r.
occur in y







The law of second order logic that is used n times in this proof is:
(3* Va(n a *)) ++ Va 3MMa *)*)
Note that Vf Va is a sequence of universally quantified variables, and hence
is essentially of the same form as Vf.
->■3 v£ *3 * (S_ A (<)> ip, (3xPx))) def of sequent
V/ 3*(S /\ (<j> T3 (ip V OxPx)) )) logic
Vf 3*(S A ((f> (ty V (3xPx) V (3xPx)))) renaming the second
x to a gensyned
variable x
Vf 3£(S A (<t> 3 W V (^xPx) v OaPa))))
Vf 3£(S^ A (4> 3 V 3a ( (3xPx) V Pa) )) )
V/, 3 MS_ A (<j> 3 3 a V (3xPx) V Pa) ))
Vf 3 MS A 3a((ji 3 iji v 3x Px V Pa))
Vf 3* 3a(S A (<1> V 3x Px V Pa)))
since a does not
occur in Px
since a does not
occur in \jj
since a does not
occur in <f>
since a does not
occur in S
def of sequent
Vf if 3a (£ A (<j> tyr 3xPx, Pa)) )
Note that 3£ 3a is a sequence of existentially quantified variables and
hence essentially of the form of 3*.
Unify We let 3£ be the sequence of existential quantifiers whose variables
are instantiated by the substitution 6 = [*'-«- f] of the unification
rule. We let 3£ be the quantifiers for any other unification
variables.
We let T be the sequents which are made tautologous by the substi¬
tution 0 and let S_ be any other sequents.
Vf 3£ 3*'S a T : is implied by:
Vf if(S_ AT) [*'-«- £] : substitution
Vf lf(f[f' ■«-£]) A a
Vf 3£ S.^.' £]
One final point is that we define the substitution t* for * into a skolem1 o
function f*Q as This is clearly consistent since Vf Vt (<j> (f (t*^) ) (t*^) )
is implied by Vf Vt(c|>(f* ) (t*Q)) .
Note that every occurence of f in VfVt (<j> (f (t* )) (t*Q)) if required to contain
Vf 3* (S[*' f3) A (T[*1 f]) T is made taut¬
ologous by 0
a term equal to t* as its argument.
